Foreword

The autobiographical three-volume *Garry Kasparov on Garry Kasparov* is a continuation of the series *My Great Predecessors* (Parts I-V) and *Modern Chess* (Parts 1-4).

Initially I was intending simply to annotate about three hundred of my best games, dividing them into three volumes in accordance with the stages of my competitive career: the pre-champion period (1973-1985), the time when I was champion within the FIDE framework (1985-1993) and the years outside of FIDE (1993-2005). But then I realised that to complete the picture I needed to include not only the best, but also the most memorable games and endings, which became landmarks on my chess career (although some of them have already been annotated in previous books).

Throughout my life it has been said that I won mainly thanks to deep and comprehensive opening preparation. Thereby – deliberately or otherwise – my ability to play creatively at the board itself was disparaged. 'I don't know another player who would prepare so thoroughly for a match or a tournament. In this respect he surpasses even the legendary Botvinnik', Anatoly Karpov once said about me. In fact, without the ability to play creatively at the board, nothing can be achieved, whereas the art of preparation has been a distinguishing feature of many world champions and has always furthered the progress of chess thinking.

In the 1920s Alekhine worked at chess more persistently than anyone before him in history, and as a result the entire culture of the 'amateur game' sharply improved. In the 1940s Botvinnik's methodical mind and scientific approach assisted the transformation of chess into a genuine profession. In the 1970s Fischer's fantastic enthusiasm for analytical work forced any player who did not want to 'miss the boat' to devote more time to theoretical preparation. In the 1980s, when I became the leader of the new opening revolution, the need for such preparation was already axiomatic.

I grew up in an atmosphere of strict discipline, created by my mother. My chess outlook was formed at the school of Mikhail Botvinnik, and my opening repertoire developed under

the influence of my trainers – the outstanding analysts Alexander Nikitin and Alexander Shakarov. Apart from an innate combinative gift, from childhood I possessed an unlimited appetite for analytical work. I studied all the latest games of the leading grandmasters, recorded novelties and analysed critical positions, trying to find improvements. The choice of a particular opening system was always the fruit of deep creative processing, and certainly not blind imitation.

Later, in the period when I was fighting for the world crown, my circle of analytical helpers expanded, but as before I tirelessly generated my own ideas. And when personal computers appeared, I was the first player to include machine analysis in my system of preparation and to make systematic use of playing programs and databases. Soon I discovered how weak some of my earlier preparations had been. A useful, sobering discovery! Under the microscope of powerful computer programs it transpired that at times I had gone along to a game not with a some kind of Excalibur, but with a blunt pen-knife.

Nevertheless, my intensive preparation was invariably rewarded with good results, even when by no means all the ideas were used. Between labour invested and success achieved there always exists if not a direct connection, then some almost mythical one. Probably also a psychological one: after all, every time when beginning a battle, I thought that I possessed some 'deadly weapon', and this gave me confidence, even if the weapon was unused or proved to be altogether ineffective.

This volume contains one hundred newly annotated games and endings. It is partly based on my first book *The Test of Time* (1986). In the preface to it Botvinnik wrote:

'Kasparov is on the right path: analyses of games should be published by a player not only to afford pleasure to the readers, but also, by putting forward the results of his work to their strict judgement, to be able to use the readers' criticisms to check the objectivity of his searchings. This is an essential step for anyone who wishes to become a researcher in chess. In this way creative and competitive successes can be raised, and the very maximum possible "squeezed" out of his talent...'

The large amount of annotation work done then was, of course, not free of analytical mistakes, and in addition the rapid progress of opening theory has changed the assessments of numerous variations. Therefore a number of annotations had to be significantly refined and amplified, and some shortened. As Botvinnik anticipated, 'not all the games have survived'. But on the whole my earlier conclusions have withstood the test of time.

I should like to express my gratitude to my former trainers Alexander Nikitin and Alexander Shakarov for their help in preparing the manuscript for publication.

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Chapter Two

Adult Games

Master Class

Sokolsky Memorial Tournament (Minsk, 08.01-02.02.1978): 1. **Kasparov** – 13 out of 17; 2. Kupreichik – 12½; 3. Shereshevsky – 11; 4–6. Kapengut, Klovans and Mochalov – 10½; 7–8. Dydyshko and Lutikov – 9½; 9. Yuferov – 9; 10-11. Roizman and Zakharov – 8½; 12–13. Begun and Smirnov – 8; 14–15. Mariasin and Litvinov – 7; 16. Kagan – 4; 17. Veremeichik – 3½; 18. Lyuboshits – 2½.

This tournament in memory of the well-known master, teacher and theoretician Alexey Sokolsky (1908-1969) was the main chess event of the year in Belorussia. From outside only distinguished masters were invited, but for me an exception was made – not so much because I was two-times USSR junior champion, but out of respect for Botvinnik.

Early in January 1978 I flew in with my mother to frosty, snowy Minsk (Shakarov and then Nikitin arrived later). Here everything was unusual: the severe winter, the cold hotel on the outskirts of the city, and the freezing tram in which the players travelled to the playing venue – the repub-

lic chess club. After settling in, we set off to look for a canteen: it was time for dinner. However, no sooner had I made one uncertain step on the pavement, when I fell into a deep hole, covered by a thick layer of snow. I was able to get out only with my mother's help. I was completely soaked, and I had to rush back to the hotel to change. My mother was seriously alarmed, but later she laughed: 'It's better to take a tumble before the start, than in the tournament itself!'

During the drawing of lots I looked round with a certain trepidation at my formidable opponents: Anatoly Lutikov (a grandmaster!), several times a finalist in the championship of the country, Albert Kapengut (an outstanding theoretician and trainer), Viktor Kupreichik, Yanis Klovans and Alexander Zakharov, and, apart from them, a dozen solid masters, practically the entire cream of Belorussian chess. I remember saying to my mother: 'How difficult it will be to score this "plus two"...' (that was the master norm – 9½ out of 17). Our small 'team' was also looked at with

interest: what surprises will be caused by this audacious youth from distant Baku? Nikitin: 'All were expecting something exotic, but that which happened was not anticipated by anyone'.

I prepared well, especially with regard to the openings: I already had my own preparations in the most seemingly well-studied positions, assessed by theory as equal. As a result I was able to create sharp, unusual situations, which were to my taste. Strictly speaking, it was only here that my battle at the board began.

In the first round I was paired with Black against the 1977 Armed Forces champion Sergey Yuferov, who was famed as an opening theoretician and who successfully played the King's Indian Defence with both colours. This was the favourite opening of my youth, which served me faithfully for almost my entire career. And I decided to throw down a challenge to the experienced master! This game opened a new page in my competitive biography – it signified my entry into the world of adult chess.

Game 21
S.Yuferov-G.Kasparov
Sokolsky Memorial Tournament,

1st round, Minsk 8.01.1978

King's Indian Defence E99

1 d4 ②f6 2 c4 g6 3 ②c3 ≗g7 4 e4 d6 5 ≗e2 0-0 6 ②f3 e5 7 0-0 ②c6 8 d5 ②e7

One of the King's Indian tabiyas.


9 🗓 e1

This continuation was popular in those times, but in the late-1980s 9 \triangle d2 came to the fore, and in the mid-1990s – 9 b4.

9...Ød7

Impeding the typical c4-c5 breakthrough. 9... 2e8 is also acceptable, as I played


against Shirov (Olympiad, Manila 1992) and Korchnoi (Debrecen 1992).



10 5)d3

The main line. Later, largely through the efforts of Korchnoi, the old plan with 10 2e3 f5 11 f3 was rehabilitated (Game No.39 in Volume V of My Great Predecessors).

10...f5 11 êd2 (11 exf5 has long been out of fashion – Game No.64 in Volume IV of *My Great Predecessors*) **11...②f6** (11...f4? 12 **ê**g4!) **12 f3**



12...f4


At that time everyone made this direct move with the idea of a pawn storm on the kingside. Later many began to prefer Geller's more flexible plan with 12... \$\displays 18\$ (or

11...堂h8), for example: 13 罩c1 c5 14 g4 a6!? 15 ②f2 h6 with the idea of ...②eg8, ...②h7 and ...皇f6 (Gelfand-Kasparov, Linares 1990). 13 c5

White must act energetically! The classic game Najdorf-Gligoric (Mar del Plata 1953) went 13 b4?! g5 14 c5 h5 15 公f2 公g6! 16 当c1 当f7 17 cxd6 cxd6 18 a4 皇f8! (defending the 'base' pawn on d6) 19 a5 当g7 20 h3 公h8!? (the knight goes by a roundabout way to h6, to support the ...g5-g4 breakthrough) 21 公b5 (21 皇e1!?) 21...g4! 22 fxg4 hxg4 23 hxg4 a6 24 公a3 皇d7! 25 公c4 当c8 26 公b6 当xc1 27 皇xc1 皇e8 28 皇a3 公f7 29 当c2 公h6, and in the end Black won with a direct attack on the king.

13...g5

This position is topical even today: using the 'Gligoric method' can Black succeed in creating sufficient counterplay to neutralise the opponent's offensive on the queenside?




14 cxd6

Now 14 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c1 \(\alpha\)g6 15 \(\alpha\)b5 is again fashionable, delaying the exchange on d6 and in some cases sacrificing a piece: 15...a6 16 cxd6! (16 \(\alpha\)a3?! g4! Pachman-Padevsky, Dresden 1956) 16...axb5 17 dxc7 (Shariyazdanov-Klimov, St. Petersburg 1997) or 15...\(\mathbb{E}\)f7 16 \(\alpha\)a5! (the point of White's idea

is to provoke weaknesses) 16...b6 17 cxb6 (17 cxd6 is also possible, since 17...bxa5? 18 dxc7 is bad for Black) 17...cxb6 (17...axb6 18 \(\text{\tex{

14...cxd6

To the surprise of the spectators, all these and the next eight moves were made quite quickly by us.



15 5 f2

Yuferov demonstrates a new plan, which had been successfully employed by Sosonko against Kavalek (Wijk aan Zee 1977). We had both seen this game: it was published in *Informator* Volume 23. White wants to play $\mbox{\sl e}$ C2 and $\mbox{\sl e}$ fc1, in order to intensify his onslaught on the queenside, and to defend his kingside with minimal forces – by holding the g4-point. The master was apparently hoping that his young opponent would not cope with the difficult problems, but I had prepared, as it seemed to me, a lethal novelty!

The usual continuation is 15 罩c1 ②g6 16 ②b5 罩f7 17 豐c2, and since 17...g4?! 18 ②c7 gxf3 19 gxf3 鱼h3 (Larsen-Tal, 5th match game, Eersel 1969) is dubious because of 20 ②e6!, the black knight is forced to retreat —


17...②e8. After 18 a4 h5 19 ②f2 ②f8 20 h3 ③g7 the following continuations are all unclear: 21 ②xa7 (Averkin-Kasparov, Moscow 1979), 21 a5 (Polugayevsky-Tal, 7th match game, Alma-Ata 1980), and 21 營b3 ②h4 22 黨c2 (Ivanchuk-Timman, 4th match game, Hilversum 1991; Ivanchuk-Cheparinov, Sofia 2008). At any event, I always happily went in for these complicated positions with Black.

15...42g6 16 a4

16 營c2 單f7 (16...h5 17 心b5) 17 罩fc1 is an attempt to refine the move order, hoping to gain an advantage after 17...心e8 18 a4 h5 19 心cd1 兔f8 20 罩a3! a6 21 營c3 兔d7 22 營a5! b6 23 營b4 罩g7 24 罩ac3 心h4 25 h3 兔e7 26 兔e1 (Aronian-Nakamura, Bursa 2010), but 17...a6 18 a4 h5 19 h3 g4! (19...心h4?! 20 a5!) 20 fxg4 hxg4 21 hxg4 兔h6! 22 a5 兔g5 23 心a4 兔h4 gives chances for both sides (my old analysis!).

16...≌f7 17 🖾b5 h5 18 h3 ዿf8

Almost completing the 'Gligoric-style' regrouping. Each side carries out his own plan, and White, while preparing a queen-side invasion, must be extremely attentive to the opponent's threats on the kingside.




19 ≝c2 a6 (2)

The first step to the side! In the aforementioned Sosonko-Kavalek game Black

immediately rushed into the attack – 19...g4 20 fxg4 hxg4 21 hxg4 a6 22 \(\tilde{\to}\)a3 \(\tilde{\to}\)gf (after Ligterink's recommendation 23 \(\tilde{\to}\)c4 there follows 23...\(\tilde{\to}\)h4 – cf. the note to White's 21st move) 23...\(\tilde{\to}\)h4 24 \(\tilde{\to}\)d1 \(\tilde{\to}\)xg4?! (the unclear 24...\(\tilde{\to}\)d7 or 24...\(\tilde{\to}\)h5!? was better), but after 25 \(\tilde{\to}\)xg4! (not 25 \(\tilde{\to}\)xg4 26 \(\tilde{\to}\)xg4 \(\tilde{\to}\)xg2! 27 \(\tilde{\to}\)xg2 \(\tilde{\to}\)h4 28 \(\tilde{\to}\)f1 \(\tilde{\to}\)xg4 29 \(\tilde{\to}\)e2 \(\tilde{\to}\)g3! or 28 \(\tilde{\to}\)h1 \(\tilde{\to}\)xg4+ 29 \(\tilde{\to}\)e3! \(\tilde{\to}\)g4+ 31 \(\tilde{\to}\)f2 \(\tilde{\to}\)e7! and wins) 25...\(\tilde{\to}\)xg4? 26 \(\tilde{\to}\)xg4 \(\tilde{\to}\)g5? (26...\(\tilde{\to}\)xg2 27 \(\tilde{\to}\)f1! was more resilient) 27 \(\tilde{\to}\)e6+ \(\tilde{\to}\)h8 28 g4! he lost.

25...\(\tilde{\t

20 🗓 a3 🗒 g7




21 **≝fc1**?

A by no means obvious but serious mistake. 21 \triangle c4 was correct, for example:

 hxg4 營g6) 22...g4! (Crouch's idea 22...置b8 23 a5 g4 24 fxg4 hxg4 25 hxg4 公xg4 26 公xg4 營g5 runs into 27 公ce3! 營g6 28 息e1! fxe3 29 公f6+ 哈h8 30 g4! or 27... 息e7 28 置f2! 營g6 29 置c1 fxe3 30 公xe3 with an obvious advantage for White) 23 fxg4 (23 息a5?! 公xf3+! — Crouch) 23...hxg4 24 hxg4 公xg4! (Crouch gives only 24... 置b8 25 置a3!), transposing into variation 'b2';


b) 21...g4, and White faces a choice – whether or not to include \(\Delta a5, but in both cases Black has sufficient counterplay:

21...②**h4** (3)



22 **≝d1** (now Yuferov is intending to play ②c4, ②a5 and ②b6, but – too late!)
22... ②d7?! (4)

This is my novelty (replacing 22...g4 23 hxg4 hxg4 24 fxg4 &xg4?! 25 &xg4! – cf. the note to Black's 19th move). It could have been regarded as an improvement, had it not been for a fantastic stroke found in the computer era – 22...&xf3+!!.



Analysis diagram

For the piece Black has a very dangerous attack: 23 &xf3 g4 24 &e2 gxh3 25 &f3 &g4! or 23 gxf3 g4 24 fxg4 (24 hxg4 will not do: 24...hxg4 25 &xg4 &xg4 26 fxg4 &xg4 27 &xg4 &h4!) 24...hxg4 25 &xq4 &h4!) 24...hxg4 25 &xq4 &h4 29 &f3 &xg4 26 fxg4 &xg4 27 &xg4 &xg4 28 hxg4 &h4 29 &f3 &xg4 28 fxg4 &xg4 29 &f3 &xg4 from this: for an instant White has weakened his defences, and his forces are stuck on the other side of the board

23 🖾c4

After the prophylactic move 23 <u>\$e</u>1 (Stohl) White has to reckon not only with 23...g4, but also 23...b5.


23...g4

Now is the time! Black cannot bring himself to play 23...b6?!, while 23...△xf3+!? 24 gxf3 g4 no longer promises more than equality after 25 fxg4 hxg4 26 &a5! ₩e8!

(26...gxh3+? 27 \$h1!) 27 hxg4 (27 公b6 f3) 27...豐h5! 28 \$f1 \$xg4 29 \$e1 \$xe2 30 豐xe2 f3 31 豐d3 b5 32 公d2 etc.

24 hxg4 (if 24 **2**a5 **2**e7 25 **2**b6? Crouch gives 25...**2**xg2, although the decisive 25...gxh3! is simpler) **24...hxg4 25 fxg4**

Now the inclusion of the moves 25 &a5?! #e7! (25... \(\alpha \) xf3+?! 26 \(\alpha \) xf3 \(\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \alpha \) could have proved fatal for White: 26 fxg4 \(\alpha \) xg4 27 \(\alpha \) xg4 \(\alpha \) xg2 28 \(\alpha \) xg4 \(



25...②xg2?!

This piece sacrifice was the fruit of home analysis, but there was something that I failed to take into account. First 25... 2xg4 was more accurate (but not 25... 2xg4? 26 2xg4 2xg2 27 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f1! - Stohl), for example:

a) 26 ②xg4? ②xg2! 27 \$xg2 \$xg4 28 \$xg4 \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$m}\$}}\$} \cdots \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$xg4}\$}\$} \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$wh4.}}}\$ An already familiar situation with the sacrifice of two pieces. With his knight on c4 White has somewhat better chances than before, but even so his defence is extremely difficult: 29 \$\text{\$\text{\$wh1}\$}\$ (or 29 \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$m\$}\$}}\$} \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$w\$}\$}}\$} \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$w\$}\$}}\$} \text{\$


has regained the piece, and still has a strong attack' (Crouch);

b) 26 &xg4 @xg2 27 &f1! &xg4 28 @xg4 @g5 29 @f2 (29 &xg2? Wh4; 29 @b6 Ee8) 29...@e3+ (29...@h4 is also not bad) 30 &xe3 fxe3 31 Wf3 exf2 32 &xf2 (Crouch) 32...Wh4+ 33 &e2 Wh2+ 34 Wf2 Wxf2+ 35 &xf2 &e7 with a roughly equal ending.

26 **∲**xg2

Played after considerable thought; White was wondering whether Black would have been set more problems by the interposition of 26 \(\daggerapsis a5\), and only after 26...\(\begin{array}{c}\begin{array}{c} = 27\end{array}\) \$xq2 \$\alpha\$xq4 28 \$\alpha\$xq4 \$\alpha\$xq4 29 \$\alpha\$xq4! (Crouch gives only 29 ②xq4? 豐h4) Black does not have the defence 31... ag4? 32 **\$**f1 **\$**d3+ 33 **\$**f2 **\$**g7 (as in a variation from the game; if 33... \(\vec{y}\) xc4? 34 \(\vec{\phi}\) xe5+) because of the simple 34 axd6, but after 31... \$f7! he is able to neutralise the opponent's slight plus: 32 公f2 豐q3+ 33 當f1 豐b3 or 32 \$\dipsi f3 b5 33 axb5 (33 \$\dipsi b6 \$\dipsi h3+ 34 \$\dipsi e2\$ 35 \$e2 \$e7 36 \$\alpha\$f3 \$\mathbb{Z}\$g8 37 \$\alpha\$f2 \$\mathbb{Z}\$xq1 38 ℤxq1 c8 39 �d2 c4 etc.

26...②xg4 27 ②xg4 (of course, not 27 **②**xq4? **③**xq4 28 **②**xq4 **◎**h4) **27...②**xg4



28 **₩xg4!**

An unpleasant surprise - a counter

queen sacrifice! My over-optimistic analysis concluded with a pursuit of the king: 28 ②xg4(?) 營h4 29 營f1 黨xg4 30 營e2 黨g3! or 29 營h1 黨xg4+ 30 營f3 黨g3+ 31 營e2 營g4+ 32 營f2 b5! etc. (as in the note to 25...②xg2). This is what I was aiming for, and the opponent's unexpected reply shocked me: now White has chances not only of repelling the attack, but also of converting his material advantage!


On the preceding moves I had spent only 23 minutes, but now for the first time I stopped to think: my swift attack had not succeeded, and I had to retune myself for a more complicated fight.

28...**≅**xg4+ (7)

Things are obviously worse after 28...\%h4? 29\%xg7+\&xg7 30\Zg1! (Stohl).

29 🖺 xg4

What next?



29...\(\beta\)c8? (7)

This seemingly natural, developing move, to which I previously attached an exclamation mark, proves simply to be a loss of time at a critical moment of the battle. The immediate 29... \$\text{\text{\text{\$\text{\$w}}}}\$ hull would have enabled Black, albeit not without some difficulty, to solve his problems and maintain equality: 30 \$\text{\text{\$\tex{

worse because of 32... 查f7!) 31... 豐d3+ 32 查f2 查g7! 33 ②h6+ (33 b3 豐d4+!, but not 33... 豐xb3?! 34 罩ac1 查f8 35 ②xd6! 豐b6+ 36 ②e3! with a powerful attack) 33... 查f8 34 ②f5 豐xc4 (it is bad to play 34... 罩c8? 35 罩xg7! 罩xc4 36 罩h1 or 34... 重f6?! 35 罩g6 查h4+ 36 ②xh4 豐d4+ 37 查f3 豐xc4 38 罩ag1!) 35 罩xg7, and after 35... 豐c2! 36 罩h1 豐xd2+ 37 查f3 豐d3+ 38 查g4 豐e2+ 39 查g5 豐g2+ 40 查f6 豐xh1 (Crouch) White has only perpetual check.

30 🖺 h2?


However, with 30 \$\delta f3! White could have parried the attack and strengthened his position: 30... g7 (the queen on its own cannot do anything - 30... Wh4? 31 罩q1! ②qxe5+), when in the event of 31 \(\bigsiz \)c3 (Crouch) Black drives the knight to the edge of the board - 31...b5! (not immediately 31... **省**h4? 32 **国q1**) 32 axb5 axb5 33 **名**a3(a5) 罩xc3+ 34 &xc3 營h4 35 罩q1 營h3+ 36 ❖e2 \$\displaystyle{1}\displaystyle to play 31 \(\delta e1!\) (defending the h4-square and vacating d2) 31...b5 32 axb5 axb5 33 ②d2 罩xc1 34 罩xc1 q5 (34...�f7 35 ❖e2! and 心h2-f3) 35 单f2 and 罩q1, with the hope of successfully regrouping and exploiting his superiority in number of pieces.

30...營**h4** (9)

The picture has suddenly changed in Black's favour. The bishop on d2 is taking

away this square from the knight, hindering the defence of the weak e4-pawn.

31 **罩c**3?



31...≝c7! (8)

The decisive manoeuvre: a mating attack on the q-file is threatened.

32 g1

A sad necessity: if 32 \$h1 單g7 33 罩f3, then 33...豐g5 34 罩f2 豐g3 35 罩af1 豐d3 and wins (Stohl).

32... Ig7+ 33 \$h1 Ixg1+ 34 \$xg1 \$h7!

It would appear that this 'long' queen move, emphasising the undefended state of the e4-pawn, was not expected by Yuferov: here he thought for nearly all of his remaining time before the control.

35 **≜xf**4


A practical chance – a sacrifice of the bishop for the sake of saving the e4- and d5-pawns, which would have fallen in quick succession after 35 \$\angle\$f3 \$\windth*xe4 36 \$\windth*f2 (36)

②b6 ₩e2! and ...e5-e4) 36...₩xd5 (Stohl).
35...exf4 36 ②d2 ₩d7 (3)

The queen is carrying out an enormous amount of work: it both attacks the a4-pawn and keeps an eye on the c-file and the g4-square. However, 36... \$\widetharpoonup g7+ 37 \$\widetharpoonup f1 \$\widetharpoonup d4\$ (Stohl) was also not bad.

An experienced master would probably have simply captured the pawn - 37... \$\mathbb{g}7+!? 38 \$\mathbb{g}f1 \$\mathbb{g}xb2\$, but I was carried away by the idea of activating my bishop to continue the attack!

38 b3



38...\(\dagge\)d4+! (11)

This unexpected and spectacular check prevents White from coordinating his pieces.


39 當h1 (39 罩xd4? 營g7+) **39...全c5 40 包df3** (there is nothing better) **40...b5!** (22)

I took my time over the last move before the control. Black breaks up the enemy fortifications on the 4th rank.

Here the game was not yet adjourned, since with a time control of 2½ hours for 40 moves I had used just 1 hour 28 minutes, and although I still had more than an hour in reserve, I continued playing very quickly.

41
© 22 (if 41 axb5 xb5 42 d2 e3 43 hf3 Black decides matters with 43... exd2


44 ②xd2 ₩b6 - Stohl)



41...\@e8 (8)

Trying to restrict White's potential activity, although again it would have been simpler to grab material: 41...bxa4 42 單g2+ 當f8 43 ②g5 (43 bxa4 豐xa4) 43...當e8 44 ②e6 豐h7 and wins (Stohl).

42 **\(\bar{g}** g2+ \(\bar{g} f8 43 \(\bar{Q} \) g5



43...**營h**5

43...豐e5! (centralisation!) was more forceful: 44 罩g4 豐a1+ 45 堂g2 豐b2+ or 44 ②hf3 豐a1+ 45 堂h2 豐h8+ 46 ②h3 bxa4 47 bxa4 堂e7 48 ②fg5 豐e5! and wins. However, my plan does not greatly lengthen the winning procedure.


44 ②e6+ \$e7 45 ■g7+ (45 **■g4** f3!?) **45...\$f6! 46 ■g4 bxa4 47 bxa4**

There was similarly little comfort in 47 $\triangle xc5$ a3! or 47 $\mathbb{Z}xf4+ \stackrel{\circ}{\otimes}e7$ 48 $bxa4 \stackrel{\circ}{\otimes}d1+$.

47... **2e3** 48 ②xf4 **2**xf4 49 **Ξ**xf4+ **2e7** 50 **2e9** (50 **2e9** a5!) 50... **2e9 3a5 3a5 3a5**

The outside passed pawn decides the game.

53 ②f5+ \$d7 54 \$h4 \$\text{\$\text{\center}}\$c2+ (54...\$\text{\$\text{\center}}\$b4! was more accurate) 55 \$\text{\$\text{\center}}\$f3 a4 (10) 56 \$\text{\$\text{\center}}\$h7+ \$\text{\$\text{\center}}\$d8



Before the end of the five hour session the players also managed to reach the second time control!

57 **≌a7**

It would not have helped to play 57 單h6 豐c3+ 58 當g4 a3 59 單xd6+ 當c7 60 單a6 豐d3 61 d6+ 當b7 or 57 ②xd6 a3 58 ②b7+ 當c8! 59 ②d6+ (59 d6 豐b3+ and ...豐xb7) 59...當b8 60 單h8+ 當a7 61 ②b5+ 當a6 62 單a8+ 當xb5 63 罩xa3 豐d1+! 64 當f2 豐g4 65 罩e3 豐f4+ 66 當e2 當c4, destroying the fortress.

Times: 3.18-2.30.

Not a bad win with Black, especially for the starting game. Of course, with a computer to hand the mutual mistakes are very apparent, but the character itself of the play – with some Tal-like strokes! – made a great impression on the public. Later events