Contents

	Bibliography	4
	Introduction	5
1	The Main Line: 8ٌ a6 without 9 b3	7
2	The Main Line: 8🕯 a6 9 b3	31
3	The Main Line: 8🖄 b6 without 9 🖄 c3	92
4	The Main Line: 8🖄 b6 9 🖄 c3	117
5	The Main Line: Early Deviations	141
6	The 4拿c5 Variation: 5 ②xc6 豐f6 6 豐d2	157
7	The 4全c5 Variation: 5 公xc6 豐f6 6 豐f3	195
8	The 4堂c5 Variation: 5 堂e3 without 5豐f6 6 c3 ②ge7 7 堂c4	230
9	The 4호c5 Variation: 5 호e3 豐f6 6 c3 夕ge7 7 호c4	273
10	The 4堂c5 Variation: Early Alternatives	320
11	The Check on b4	335
12	Odds and Ends	357
	Index of Variations	378

Introduction

The Scotch Game has been one of my favourite openings as White ever since I took it up a decade ago. It's far sounder than the majority of gambit lines available to White after 1 e4 e5, but like them leads to unbalanced positions in which the defender is likely to feel much less at home than in the generally more rational lines of the Ruy Lopez. In short, the Scotch leads to a complex, exciting early middlegame in which White can most certainly aspire to the advantage.

Throughout the 1990s Garry Kasparov was the main torch-bearer for the Scotch and under his patronage a large number of Grandmasters adopted the opening, no doubt attracted by the extremely original positions which arise after 4... 665 axc6 bxc6 6 e5 e7 e7 e2 ad5 8 c4 and then 8... a6 or 8... b6. In the first few years of the new millennium Black's other main defence, 4... c5, caused a number of players, including Kasparov, to lose some of their faith in the Scotch, not least because new defences were worked out after 5 axc6 e6 6 ed2. However, the wheel didn't take long to turn full circle, thanks to new discoveries being found for White after 5 ac3 and especially 5 axc6 ef6 6 ef3!? Indeed, nowadays the Scotch occupies a prominent part in the repertoire of Kasparov's sometime protégé, Magnus Carlsen, and is regularly employed as well by the likes of Alexander Morozevich, Teimour Radjabov and especially Sergei Rublevsky, not forgetting too the talented, young grandmasters Emanuel Berg, Gawain Jones and Ian Nepomniachtchi.

Having spent many months studying recent grandmaster games in and existing theory on the Scotch, it quickly became clear that this project was going to be far bigger than I ever could have envisaged. As such I was very pleased when Richard Palliser agreed to come onboard. Richard not only added to the number of new ideas I'd found, but also updated much of the existing work, while helping to present the theory and key motifs of each variation as clearly as possible.

Both your authors have to admit to a certain bias for White's cause in the Scotch, but this is very much a complete work and those who defend 1 e4 e5 should also find much of interest, as well as plenty of new ideas within. Now I just


The Scotch Game

hope that you will enjoy your adventures with or against the Scotch as much as I've always done!

Yelena Dembo, Athens, December 2010

Chapter Ten The 4...ዿc5 Variation: Early Alternatives

1 e4 e5 2 ∅f3 ∅c6 3 d4 exd4 4 ∅xd4 Ձc5



Having examined White's two main continuations, we now turn our attention to the remaining less-popular and generally less-critical ways to deal with the early attack on his knight.

A: 5 🖄 f5 B: 5 🖄 b3 Line A has aggressive intent, but backfires in the face of forceful play from Black. However, Line B has recently received some attention thanks to an aggressive new plan championed by Magnus Carlsen.

Otherwise, 5 \$\angle\$1f3 \$\angle\$1f6 6 \$\mathrev{\text{\text{\text{\text{a}}}}\$d}\$3 (and not 6 e5? \$\angle\$2g4 with a double-attack) 6...0-0 7 0-0 already allows Black at least full equality with 7...d5, as does 5 c3?! \$\angle\$1f6 6 \$\angle\$2xc6 bxc6 7 \$\mathrev{\text{\text{\text{\text{c}}}}\$d}\$3 (O.Ottesen-R.Berg, Reykjavik 2009) 7...d5.


A) 5 🗹 f5?! d5!

This powerful pawn sacrifice has pretty much consigned White's aggressive approach to the bin.

6 ②xg7+

Neither does declining the pawn help White, as Black also obtains the initiative after both 6 exd5 2xf5 7 exec 8 dxc6 bxc6 and 6 2c3 2xf5 7 exf5 #e7+ 8 2e2 0-0-0.

6...**∲**f8



7 🖺 h5

7...**₩h4! 8 ᡚg3 ᡚf6!**


While White has spent six tempi moving his knight around, Black has developed his queen and minor pieces to very active squares, thereby already giving him a highly-dangerous initiative.

9 <u></u> **≜**e2

Wisely directed against the threat of 9... 294 and once again White has hardly prospered with the alternatives:

- a) 9 exd5? \$ g4 10 f3 \$ 8e8+ 11 \$ e2 \$ \$ d4 12 \$ c3 \$ xf3! saw White being crushed in the old game J.Minchin-W.Wayte, London 1900.
- b) The desperate counter-gambit 9 b4? was tried in J.Bauma-P.Zvara, Czech League 2007, but after just 9... 2xb4 Black's initiative has scarcely been diminished.

9...dxe4!



The simplest reaction, regaining the pawn and preparing to occupy the d-file. Unsurprisingly Black has scored well from here in practice, with White facing problems housing his king and developing his queenside:

- a) 10 \(\existseq e3 \) \(\existseq xe3 \) 11 fxe3 was an attempt to reduce the attacking force in A.Grekh-A.Tukhaev, Simferopol 2000, but with \(11...\existsq g4 \) Black retains a strong initiative.
- b) 10 0-0 is best met by 10... \$\mu g8\$, menacing an exchange sacrifice, as well as ideas of ... \$\mu g4\$.


compensation in W.Puntier-C.D'Amore, Calvia Olympiad 2004.

d) 10 ②c3 ②e6 11 ②e3 (otherwise, 11 ③d2? e3! 12 fxe3 〖d8 13 ②d3 〖g8 was a disaster for White in A.Damia-J.Tuma, Brno 2006, while the 11 ②d2 of H.Strehlow-R.Rabiega, Berlin 2007, should just be met by 11...〖g8, retaining the initiative) 11...②xe3 12 fxe3 〖d8 13 ⑥c1 h5 14 b3 ⑥g5 saw Black maintain the initiative and the upper hand in Y.Yakovich-A.Goldin, Moscow 1994.

B) 5 🖺 b3

A much more sensible approach, removing the knight from attack with gain of tempo.

5...≜b6




Here White must decide whether or not to harass Black's bishop on b6:

B1: 6 a4 B2: 6 🖄 c3

B3: 6 ₩e2


White's remaining options are generally a little planless and unimpressive:

- a) 6 总d3 營h4 7 0-0 ②f6 8 h3 d6 gives Black good, active development and full equality. Moreover, it's White who must be careful here, as was shown by 9 ②1d2? 总xh3! 10 營f3 (10 gxh3? 營g3+ 11 含h1 營xh3+ 12 含g1 ②g4 13 ②f3 營g3+ 14 含h1 总xf2 is crushing) 10...总e6 and Black won in G.Seils-M.Heintze, Stralsund 1988.
- b) 6 &c4?! Wh4 7 0-0 (or 7 We2 2e5! when Black seizes the initiative) 7...2f6 8 h3?! 2xe4 9 We2 0-0 simply left White a pawn down in J.Gonczi-E.Szurovszky, Heves 1999.
- c) 6 c4 is the most popular of these lesser options, clamping down on the d5-square.




However, after 6...d6 7 公c3 (otherwise, 7 鱼e2 營h4 8 0-0 公f6 9 公c3 公g4!? 10 鱼xg4 鱼xg4 11 營c2 a5 12 鱼f4 0-0 13 鱼g3 營h5 gave Black good activity in D.Genocchio-M.Lazic, Cortina d'Ampezzo 2004, and the 7 鱼d3 營h4! 8 0-0?! 公f6 9 營e2 of H.Murtez-

D.Gurtner, Geneva 2004, should have been met by 9... \$\int_0 e_5\$, menacing 10... \$\int_0 fg4\$ with dangerous attacking prospects) Black should not be too unhappy thanks to his strong presence on the dark squares:



c1) 7... ge7 8 ge2 (8 we2?! 0-0 9 ge3 was a rather ambitious idea in G.Kuzmin-O.Kulicov, Kramatorsk 2003, and might have been punished by 9... ge8 10 0-0-0 ge83+ 11 wes3 a5 when Black is the first to attack) 8...0-0 was solid and fine for Black in S.Kalygin-V.Malaniuk, Alushta 2004.


c2) 7... 166 8 2e2 0-0 (but not 8... 15e5?! because of 9 c5! dxc5 10 2xd8+ 2xd8 11 f4 2g6 12 e5 with more than enough for the pawn) 9 2g5 was seen in D.Szopka-T.Dziadykiewcz, Czestochowa 1994, and after 9... 16 10 2h4 2e8 the pressure against e4 gives Black the initiative.



B1) 6 a4

Until quite recently it was believed that this push represented White's only real attempt to make something out of his fifth move.

6...a6!



The most flexible and popular response. That said, 6...a5 is also playable and after 7 ②c3 ②ge7 (the ambitious 7...豐f6 8 豐e2 ②b4 could have backfired in J.Isaev-J.Piket, Elista 1998, had White seized the initiative with the logical 9 ②b5) 8 ②g5 f6 9 ②h4 0-0 10 豐d2 d6 11 ②e2 ②b4 the respective queenside holes roughly cancelled each other out in V.Samolins-J.Klovans, Riga 2009.

7 **②**c3

Invariably played, especially because pushing the a-pawn on doesn't achieve much: 7 a5 \(\hat{a}\)a7 8 \(\hat{a}\)d6 9 0-0 \(\hat{D}\)f6 10 \(\hat{a}\)g5 h6 11 \(\hat{a}\)xf6 \(\bar{w}\)xf6 12 \(\hat{D}\)c3 was seen in N.Bozilov-V.Stoimenov, Dimitrovgrad 2003, and now 12...\(\hat{D}\)e7 would have left Black fully equal.


7...d6

Again the most flexible and likely the best, but there are alternatives:

a) 7... \$\bigsigma 6 8 \$\bigsigma 2 & ge7 9 & d5!? (trying to punish Black's slightly ambitious approach; earlier 9 h4 h6 10 g4 & d4 11 \$\bigsigma xd4 & xd4 12 & d2 d6 13 f4 g6 14 & g2 & d7 had also led to a rather unclear

middlegame in S.Ansell-S.Ganguly, Edinburgh 2003) 9...②xd5 10 exd5+ ②e7 11 a5 ②a7 12 h4 d6?! (natural, but 12...h6!? is probably an improvement; then 13 罩a4?! is much less effective on account of 13...0-0 14 罩f4 營d6) 13 罩a4! saw White seize the initiative in J.Van der Wiel-M.Merbis, Leiden 2010, with the creative idea of 13...0-0? 14 罩f4.

c) 7...4 f6




8 \(\)e2 (White may do better with 8 \(\)d3 d6 9 \(\)g5!?, since 9...h6 10 \(\)ch h4 g5 11 \(\)g3 \(\)e7 12 0-0 \(\)ce 6 13 \(\)d5 \(\)cxd5 14 exd5 \(\)ce 5 15 \(\)Ee1 gave him the initiative in C.Debray-L.Fressinet, Paris 2007, but the immediate 8 \(\)g5 allowed Black to obtain decent counterplay with 8...h6 9 \(\)ch h4 d6 10 \(\)ce 2 \(\)ce 6 11 0-0 g5!? - only now! - 12 \(\)ce g3 h5 in J.Poenisch-V.Malaniuk, Dresden (rapid) 2010) 8...d6 9 0-0 h6 10 \(\)ce h1 0-0 11 f4 \(\)Ee8 12 \(\)ce f3 \(\)ce 6 13 a5 \(\)ce a7 left both

sides with trumps and was about equal in J.Gallagher-S.Brunello, Dresden Olympiad 2008.

8 **∅**d5

Continuing to harass the bishop, but White has also tested a number of alternatives:

a) 8 a5 again fails to impress: 8...\$\dot{\delta}a7 9 \delta e2 (Black was also better after 9 \delta d3 \delta f6 10 \delta e2 \delta e6 11 \delta d5 0-0 12 0-0 \delta xd5 13 exd5 \delta e8! 14 \delta f3 \delta e5 in E.Velazco-S.Ludena, Arequipa 2003, and after the 9 \delta e2 \delta e6 10 \delta d5 of V.Vigfusson-L.Blomstrom, Copenhagen 2007, one simple route to easy equality is 10...h6 11 \delta e3 \delta xe3 12 \delta xe3 \delta f6) 9...\delta f6 10 g4?? (a shocking decision; correct was the simple 10 0-0 with equality) 10...\delta xg4! 11 \delta xg4 \delta h4 unfurls a double-attack against the bishop and f2.




Unsurprisingly White was swiftly routed after 12 \(\extrm{\text{\te}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi{\text{\text{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\tex

b) The 8 we2 2e6 9 2e3 2xe3 10 wxe3 of G.Botterill-A.Perkins, Clacton

on Sea 1974, isn't a particularly inspiring approach and is a little illogical after the earlier 5 🖾 b3 and 6 a4. Here 10... 🖺 f6 11 🙎 e2 0-0 12 0-0 🖺 e8 should unsurprisingly be fine for Black.

- c) 8 2c4 16 9 2g 2e is also equal, but White must now avoid the trap 10 16 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e
- d) 8 \$\displaystyle=6.59 \$\displaystyle=6.59 \$\displaystyle=6.10 \$\displaystyle=6.20 \displaystyle=6.10 \$\displaystyle=6.20 \displaystyle=6.10 \$\displaystyle=6.20 \displaystyle=6.10 \$\displaystyle=6.20 \displaystyle=6.10 \$\displaystyle=6.20 \displaystyle=6.10 \$\displaystyle=6.20 \displaystyle=6.10 \$\displaystyle=6.20 \$\displ

8...**≜**a7




9 <u> </u>êe2

White settles for simple development. Such an approach is unlikely to trouble Black, but in any case the position appears fairly level:

a) 9 2e3 2xe3 (there's no real reason to allow White to exchange on a7) 10 2xe3 2f6 11 2d3 (but not the 11 f4? 2xe4 12 \frac{1}{2}f6 13 0-0-0 0-0 14 g4 of W.Danneck-R.Kurz, Hockenheim 1994, because 14...2e6 15 g5 2d7 would have shown up White's play as

being too ambitious) 11...0-0 12 0-0 Ee8 leaves White quite strong on the light squares, but Black with sufficient counterplay down the e-file and potentially on the dark squares.




Indeed, with 13 f3 (13 2d2 was preferred in J.Rodriguez-Y.Kraidman, Siegen 1970, but 13...2e5 would have attacked White's remaining bishop while preparing ...d5) 13...2d7 14 c4 2b8! 15 2f2 2a7 Black had found his queen a dark-square role and enjoyed good counterplay in J.Hector-B.Sahl, Vejle 1994.

b) 9 we2 &e6 10 &e3 &xe3 11 wxe3
②f6 12 &c4 (after the 12 0-0-0?! 0-0 13 f4 of T.Halasz-P.Lukacs, Budapest 1979, 13... xd5 14 exd5 ②e7 gives Black strong play against the vulnerable pawns on a4 and d5) 12...0-0 13 0-0
Ze8 14 wf3 &xd5 15 exd5 ②e5 16 wf4 saw White trying to exchange his way to a draw in A.Vuckovic-A.Karpatchev, German League 2005, but here 16... xc4 17 wxc4 Ze4 was one way for Black to retain an edge.

c) 9 \forall f3!? is an ambitious try, dis-

suading ... 16 and provoking complications. However, after 9... 26 Black seems to be able to obtain enough counterplay:



- c2) Zhang Pengxiang's 10 \(\Delta d2 \) prepares \(\Delta c3, \) but Black shouldn't have any problems after 10...\(\Delta ge7. \)
- c3) 10 👑 g3 is critical, but 10... 🖢 xd5! 11 exd5 🗈 b4 12 👑 xg7?! (White should prefer 12 🖢 c4 🖾 e7! 13 0-0 0-0, retaining equality) 12... 👑 f6 13 👑 xf6 🖾 xf6 14 🚊 d3 (and not 14 🚖 d1? 🖾 g4, as in R.Chalmeta Ugas-H.Mestre Bellido, Barbera del Valles 2008) 14... 🖾 xd3+ 15 cxd3 🖾 xd5 saw Black regaining his pawn with a pull in I.Salonen-I.Skrjabin, Espoo 2006.
- d) 9 \(\frac{1}{2}g5?!\) might appeal to some ambitious or just weak players, but 9...\(\frac{1}{2}xq5!\) 10 \(\hat{2}xc7+\hat{2}e7\) 11 \(\hat{2}xa8\) \(\hat{2}f6\)


12 營d2 營e5 should turn out rather well for Black, since the knight is in some trouble on a8: for example, 13 f3 d5 with some initiative or 13 总d3 ②xe4 14 ②xe4 營xe4+ 15 ②d1 營xg2 16 黨e1+ ②e6 17 ②c7 ②xf2 and Black has far too much for the exchange.

We now return to 9 \(\mathbb{2} e2: \)

9...4 f6! 10 0-0

White must always beware tactics on f2 in this line and here 10 \$g5? \$\times xf2+ 11 \$\times f1\$ (11 \$\times xf2? \$\times xe4+ 12 \$\times e1\$ \$\times xg5\$ regains the piece with a two-pawn surplus) 11...\$\times a7!\$ 12 \$\times xf6\$ gxf6 13 \$\times d2\$ \$\times e6\$ 14 \$\times h6\$ \$\times d7!\$ 15 \$\times xf6+\$\$\times c8\$ leaves Black on top. So too does 10 \$\times xf6+\$\times xf6\$ 11 0-0 0-0 12 \$\times h1\$ \$\times e8\$ 13 \$\times e6\$ 14 c4 (H.Velchev-M.Stoinev, Plovdiv 2003) 14...\$\times g6!\$ followed by ...f5 with the initiative.

10...②xd5 11 exd5 ②e5



Thus Black has managed to leave White with a pawn not a piece on d5, while bringing his own knight to a promising square.

12 Ad4

White hurries to recentralize his

knight, but in any case Black is already slightly the more comfortable.


12 \hat{Q} f4 was preferred in R.Wade-E.Mulcahy, Munich 1954, but after 12...0-0 13 \hat{Q} d2 \hat{Q} f5 14 \hat{Q} a3 \hat{Q} d7 15 c4 \hat{Q} fe8 Black had the initiative and should have met 16 \hat{Q} d4? with 16... \hat{Q} xc4! 17 \hat{Q} xc4 \hat{Q} xd4 18 \hat{Q} xd4 \hat{Q} e4.

Much more recently 12 \$\cong h1\$ was tried in D.Eggleston-P.Doggers, Budapest 2007, but after the continuation 12...0-0 13 f4 \$\oldsymbol{\Omega}\d7\$ followed by ...\$\oldsymbol{\Omega}f6\$ and ...\$\oldsymbol{\Omega}f5\$ Black can have no complaints whatsoever.

12...0-0 13 f4?!

Too ambitious. White had to settle for 13 @e3, pretty pleasant though 13... h4 would have been for Black.

13...**∮**]g4!




This strong blow left White in trouble in H.Pfleger-P.Keres, Tallinn 1973, and after 14 ②xg4?! ②xg4 15 營xg4 ②xd4+ 16 ⑤h1 f5! the legendary Estonian was well on his way to the full point, but even the more prudent 14 h3 ②f6 15 ②f3 置e8 16 ⑤h2 ②d7 would have given Black an edge.

B2) 6 🖒 c3

White keeps his options open for a move: 7 a4 or 7 we2 may yet follow.

6...d6



This looks like Black's best move order, although his choice does partly depend on how he likes to meet 6 we2 (Line B3). Otherwise:

- a) The misguided 6...a6?! 7 心d5 皇a7 was brutally punished by 8 豐g4! g6?! 9 豐g3 d6 10 皇g5 f6 11 豐c3! 當f7 12 0-0-0 in H.Odeev-H.Mikati, Guangzhou 2010.
- b) 6...②f6 7 皇g5 (for 7 豐e2 see Line B3) 7...h6 8 皇h4 doesn't seem to be too scary a pin and after 8...d6 9 皇d3 g5 10 皇g3 豐e7 11 h4 罩g8 12 hxg5 hxg5 13 豐d2 皇e6 14 0-0-0 0-0-0 Black enjoyed full equality in K.Lahno-B.Bok, German League 2010.
- c) 6... \$\equiv f6!? echoes Black's play after 5 \$\infty \text{xc6}\$ and is a slightly awkward attack on f2. White usually responds 7 \$\equiv e2\$ and so we'll consider this position in Line B3.

7 🖾 d5


White chases down the bishop, which this time has no escape. Others

here are:

- a) 7 a4 a6 is another route into Line B1.
 - b) 7 \wedge e2 transposes to Line B3.
- c) 7 &d3 Wh4! (we will see plenty more of this aggressive, logical and strong deployment below) 8 g3 Wf6 9 f4 2ge7 10 We2 0-0 11 &e3 &xe3 12 Wxe3 a5 13 a4 &e6 14 2d2 was seen in L.Kernazhitsky-V.Romanov, Kiev 2004, and now 14... b4 would have been fine for Black.
- d) 7 g3 \$\alpha\$1f6 8 \(\textrm{\$\denta\textrm{\$
- e) 7 皇f4 (F.Anton-K.Tsoumanis, Mecklenburg 2006) 7...心f6 8 營d2 0-0 9 f3 a5! also sees Black beginning to assume the initiative.
- f) And so does 7 &c4 De5! 8 &e2 (and not 8 We2?, as White played in M.Lugosi-T.Simon, Hungarian League 2007, because of 8...Wh4! with the nasty idea of 9...&g4, not to mention the attacked bishop) 8...Df6 9 0-0 h6 10 h3 0-0 11 Wh1 (N.Greb-M.Muskardin, Bjelolasica 2008) 11...Ee8 12 f4 Dc6 13 &f3 a5!. Indeed, an early a-pawn advance can be used by both sides in this variation to weaken the opponent's queenside, with the b4-square a particularly good outpost for a black knight.


7...**⊮h**4!

Just when White thought he was picking up the bishop-pair, Black counters in time against e4 and f2.



8 **₩f**3

8...5)f6!




9 🖾 xf6+

White changes tack. He can remain true to his initial idea, but after 9 🖾 xb6 axb6 10 &d3 0-0 11 0-0 Black clearly

doesn't have any problems. Indeed, he might even try to seize the initiative by attacking e4 with the unstereotyped 11... \(\begin{array}{c} 44!?. \end{array} \)


9...₩xf6 10 ₩xf6 gxf6



Taking stock we can see that White has fractured Black's kingside, but at a slight cost in terms of time. Moreover, ...f5 is imminent and after 11 c3 (11 \$\displies b5 f5 12 exf5 \displies xf5 13 c3 0-0-0 left Black with the safer king and beginning to attack in I.Radulov-S.Gligoric, Vrbas 1977) 11...\displies e6 (11...f5!?) 12 \displies f4 0-0-0 13 \displies g3 f5 14 exf5 \displies xf5 15 0-0-0 \displies de8 Black clearly had no problems whatsoever in P.Simacek-D.Schwarz, Slovakian League 2005.

This aggressive sideline (White plans 7 &e3, 8 ©c3 and 9 0-0-0) was used with some success by Magnus Carlsen in the 2009 World Blitz Championship. It had actually been introduced into top-flight praxis by Ivanchuk back in 2004, after which 6 We2 began to gain a few adherents, but


only over the past year has it become quite topical.



Before we discuss 6 we2, we should examine a question of move order: should White start with 6 we2 or prefer 6 c3 followed by 7 we2? It is still a little too early to be able to supply a definitive answer, but Carlsen himself did begin with 6 c3 in a recent game. After 6 c3 Black has:


如xd4 鱼xd4 10 鱼xd4 (10 營d2!? would be a more aggressive approach) 10...營xd4 11 單d1 營b6 12 營b5 0-0 13 鱼e2 Black was quite solid, but White undoubtedly had a small pull in E.Ghaem Maghami-P.Harikrishna, Guangzhou 2010.

c) 6... 16 7 we2 0-0 8 2 q5 h6 9 2 h4 (the far too ambitious 9 h4?! d6! 10 f3?! failed to 10...hxq5 11 hxq5 42q4! 12 Bastia (rapid) 2004) 9...a5 10 a4 4 d4 (tempting but Carlsen doesn't fear the doubled b-pawns; perhaps 10...d6!? is more critical when one rather unclear line runs 11 \(\d\)d5!? q5 12 \(\d\)xb6 cxb6 13 åg3 ∅xe4 14 0-0-0 åf5 15 ∅d4 ∅xd4 16 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xd4 when White's kingside is still asleep, but Black's wrecked structure should grant him decent compensation) 11 \(\exists d3! \Quad xb3 \) 12 cxb3 \(\quad e8 \) 13 0-0-0 reaches an original and fairly unclear position.



White's queenside may not make a pretty picture, but his king is safe and e-pawn mobile; factors which combined to leave him somewhat for

choice after 13...d6 14 wc2 ad7?! (slow; Black had to avoid 14...ae6?! 15 e5, but 14...c6!? 15 ac4 we7 would have kept matters fairly unclear: for example, 16 ahe1 ae6 17 ad5!? cxd5 18 exd5 g5! 19 dxe6 d5 and Black seems to be holding his own in the resulting tactical flurry) 15 ac4 ae6 16 ahe1 we7 17 e5! dxe5 18 axe5 wf8 19 axf6 gxf6 20 ae2 in M.Carlsen-E.Bacrot, Nanjing 2010.



6...d6


Black's invariable choice, but this is by no means forced:

- a) As elsewhere in the 5 Db3 variation, 6...a5!? deserves attention. Certainly 7 a4 (Black doesn't have any problems after 7 \$\delta\$e3 a4 8 D3d2 \$\delta\$xe3 9 \delta\$xe3 \$\delta\$f6) 7... \delta\$ge7 8 Dc3 Db4 9 \$\delta\$5!? may be critical) 9...f6 10 \$\delta\$h4 0-0 11 0-0-0 d5 gave Black decent-enough counterplay in S.Novikov-A.Aleksandrov, Sochi 2005.
- b) 6... 2d4 7 2xd4 2xd4 is a little too simplistic: 8 c3!? (the more straightforward 8 2c3 d6 9 4d3 should also suffice for an edge) 8... 2b6 9 2a3! a6?! (Black doesn't have time to pre-

serve her bishop so) 10 公c4 全a7 11 e5! b5 saw one of your authors gain a strong, early initiative in Y.Dembo-A.Stefanova, Rijeka 2010, and now 12 營e4!? 置b8 13 全e3! 全xe3 (or 13...全b7 14 營g4, taking aim at that eversensitive g7-pawn) 14 公xe3 公e7 15 全d3 would have left White in charge of the position.

7 **≜e3** ②f6

The main line, but it may be that Black does better with 7... 2ge7!? 8 2c3 0-0 9 0-0-0, thereby obtaining quite a solid set-up and one in which the fpawn may be employed to begin counterplay.




Yet another recent high-level encounter, T.Radjabov-E.Tomashevsky, Plovdiv 2010, continued 9.... 全6 (9.... f5!? looks more consistent and after 10 營位2 全6 11 空b1 空h8 12 全b5 fxe4 13 公xe4 公f5 14 全g5 White was at most a touch better in T.Thorhallsson-G.Sargissian, Copenhagen 2007) 10 f4 空h8 11 空b1 營e8 12 全xb6 (12 h4!? is also tempting, provoking 12... f5, as then White has 13 公b5! 營d7 14 全xb6 axb6 15 e5 with a

central breakthrough) 12...axb6 13 g4 f6 14 h4 豐f7 15 f5 皇xb3 16 cxb3 ②e5 17 g5 and White must be slightly better here, although in the game Black's solid defences held.

8 **②**c3 0-0

Black has also gone long with 8... \$\cong e 7 \quad 9 \quad 0-0-0 \text{ \text{\tex{




Indeed, with 14 2xe6 (it's logical to trade the bishop, but 14 2b5 2d7 15 2de2 4e5 16 4f4 4xf4+ 17 2xf4 was also enough for a small edge in M.Carlsen-V.Tkachiev, Moscow (blitz) 2009) 14... 4xe6 15 4d2 4e5 16 2c4 4e7 17 2d5! 2xd5 18 exd5 2a7 19

The White had obtained the superior minor piece and begun to take control in E.Berg-M.Carlhammar, Gothenburg 2010.

9 0-0-0

We've now reached a position which is fast becoming a critical tabiya for this sub-variation.



9...≝e8

Thematic, but Black might again turn to his a-pawn in the bid for counterplay with 9...\$\(\omega\)xe3 + 10 \$\omega\)xe3 a5. This also appears quite logical, but with the precise 11 \$\omega\)d4 \$\omega\)e7 12 \$\omega\b5! \$\omega\)xd4 13 \$\omega\)xd4 \$\omega\)e6 15 \$\omega\xe5 dxe5 16 \$\omega\)a4! White obtained an edge which he went on to convert in M.Carlsen-R.Ponomariov, Moscow (blitz) 2009.

That may help to explain why active players have recently begun investigating 9...\$\overline{\text{2}}\text{6 10 f3 }\overline{\text{2}}\text{d7!?, relying on piece-play. Moreover, White must not underestimate the strength of the knight coming to e5, as he appeared to with 11 g4?! (11 \overline{\text{0}}\text{d4 }\overline{\text{2}}\text{xd4 12 }\overline{\text{2}}\text{xd4 is a more prudent approach and after 12...\$\overline{\text{9}}\text{5+ 13 }\overline{\text{wd2}}\text{2}\overline{\text{wd2}}\text{2+ 14 }\overline{\text{xd2}}\text{a6}

15 f4 f6 16 全2 單fe8 17 全f3 White even had an edge in E.Berg-M.Ivanov, Gothenburg 2010, but here Black might do better to secure some counterplay with 15...f5!?) 11...公de5 12 罩g1 in H.Nakamura-N.Kosintseva, Cap d'Agde (rapid) 2010, whereupon 12...豐f6! 13 罩g3 公c4 would have left White on the back foot.

10 f3 **≜**e6

This may be a little too routine and once again there are alternatives:

- a) 10...②e5!? 11 👑d2 ②e6 12 ②e2 ③c4 13 g4 ③xe3 14 ∰xe3 c6 15 g5 was seen in the stem game V.lvanchuk-V.Topalov, Monte Carlo (blindfold) 2004, and now Black would have been okay in the complications after 15...②d5!, as pointed out by Mikhalevski. Thus the critical line is likely 15 ②d4!? d5 16 g5 ②fd7 17 b3, which may be slightly in White's favour.
- b) 10... xe3+ 11 xe3 a5 12 b1?! a4! 13 ac1 a3 gave Black good counterplay in G.Arzumanian-Y.Balashov, Tula 2004, but White should have recentralized with 12 ad4, as again Mikhalevski has pointed out in his excellent column for ChessPublishing.com.


11 \(\prec{1}{2} \) xb6!?

White doesn't fear the resulting half-open a-file, but one can certainly also make a decent case for the immediate 11 \(\begin{array}{c}\)d2.

11...axb6 12 \(\begin{array}{c} \text{d2} \end{array}\)

White has managed to prevent Black from breaking with ...d5, but Black's position remains pretty solid

and he can look to the a-file for counterplay. Perhaps White is a touch better, but it would be surprising if there weren't further developments here over the coming months. For now let's examine Carlsen's two experiences from this position in the 2009 World Blitz Championship:



- a) 12...\(\textit{2}\textit{xb3}\) 13 cxb3 \(\textit{\general}\text{e7}\) (Mikhalevski's 13...\(\text{2}\)d7!? intending ...\(\text{2}\)c5 would at least give Black some counterplay against White's slightly vulnerable king position) 14 \(\text{\general}\text{b5}\)\(\text{\general}\text{e5}\) 15 \(\text{\general}\text{b1}\)\(\text{\general}\text{ed8}\) 16 a3! saw White keeping the queenside situation under control while preparing \(\text{2}\text{d5}\) with a pull in M.Carlsen-A.Naiditsch, Moscow (blitz) 2009, but after 16...\(\text{2}\text{e7}?!\) the breakthrough 17 f4 \(\text{\general}\text{e6}\) 18 e5! gave him even more than that.

Conclusion

When I (YD) started work on this book in 2008, 5 ♠b3 looked more respectable than 5 ♠f5, but that was about it. Indeed, practice has shown that the plan of 5...♠b6 6 a4 isn't too challenging, especially when compared with White's approaches in our last four chapters. However, thanks to the patronage of Ivanchuk and Carlsen, 6 ₩e2 and the closely-related 6 ♠c3 d6 7 ₩e2 has evolved into quite a dangerous

weapon. Despite the fact that the players generally castle on opposite sides, White must be happy with quite a small edge in a manoeuvring middlegame, but we are talking about decent prospects of an edge for White... at least at the time of this book going to press! Undoubtedly the ball is currently in Black's court here, but he may be able to hit back, especially by pursuing a more active approach than Carlsen's opponents have generally done.