

**GARRY KASPAROV**  
**ON**  
**GARRY KASPAROV**

**PART III: 1993-2005**

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# Foreword

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This concluding volume of my autobiographical trilogy *Garry Kasparov on Garry Kasparov* contains one hundred of the most memorable games and endings played during the 12 years after my withdrawal from FIDE (1993-2005), and also a selection of my best games from simultaneous displays with professionals, as well as from rapid and blitz tournaments.

As regards drama and the intensity of events, this last period of my career was not inferior to all its preceding stages taken together. Whereas earlier the graph of my tournament successes, with slight exceptions, invariably proceeded upwards, now it more resembled a sinusoid. There were various reasons for the slumps in my play, but the chief of these was the psychological discomfort caused by the almost constant opposition with FIDE.

After winning matches under the aegis of the Professional Chess Association (PCA), against Short (1993) and Anand (1995), I remained the 'historic' champion. But Karpov, after winning his match against Timman (1993) became the FIDE version of the champion and then, after defeating Kamsky (1996), he retained his title. The situation at the chess summit became complicated, and I even had to explain to the public: 'I am the world champion. Not a version, but the chess world champion!'

The arguments should finally have been resolved by a unification match, envisaged in a declaration of cooperation between FIDE and the PCA. The guarantor of a sixth (!) Kasparov-Karpov match was the new FIDE president Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, who in August 1996 signed a preliminary agreement with the contestants. The chess world was on the verge of unification. But instead of this, breaking with an historic tradition, Ilyumzhinov began staging mass world championships on a knock-out system.

Although at that time I won a number of notable tournaments, including Las Palmas 1996 and Linares 1997, the time had come to again defend my title. After the collapse of the match with Karpov and the departure from chess of the powerful PCA sponsor – the Intel company – I was forced myself to find a worthy match opponent. In February 1998 Senor Rentero, the permanent organiser of the tournaments in Linares, came to the rescue. He suggested hold-

ing an Anand-Kramnik candidates match in the early summer, a world championship match in the autumn, and then setting up a full qualifying cycle. Alas, this plan was also wrecked. First Anand refused to play, and when his replacement Shirov defeated Kramnik, money could not be found for my match with Shirov...

But the intensive preparations for a world championship match were not wasted and led to a new upsurge in my play in 1999-2000. This period became the second peak of my career (the first, I should remind you, was in 1988-1990). I won six super-tournaments in succession and achieved the unprecedented rating of 2851 – despite rating inflation, this world record stood for 13 years.

Early in 2000 English organisers suggested holding a world championship match in the autumn between me and Anand. However, Vishy again declined (it would appear that our 1995 match had traumatised him psychologically), and I chose the most difficult opponent – Kramnik, who shared victory with me in Linares 2000. Kramnik fully exploited this chance opportunity: by winning the match he became the 14th world champion.

After this I scored another four tournament victories, twice finishing ahead of Kramnik (I beat him in Astana 2001), and I established another world record – ten super-tournament victories in succession. In my view, Kramnik was morally obliged to sign an agreement to a return match. But apparently back in November 2000 he decided for himself: he would not play Kasparov again for the world championship!

Particular hopes were raised by a resolution to unite the chess world, signed on 6 May 2002 in Prague by the FIDE president Ilyumzhinov together with the 13th and 14th champions. FIDE became the sole legal holder of the title of world champion and the only organisation that could hold official world championships, and in return it approved a unification plan, according to which Kramnik would play a match with the winner of a qualifying tournament in Dortmund 2002, the FIDE knock-out world champion Ponomarev would play Kasparov, the No.1 in the rating list, and ‘the winner of these two matches would meet in a unifying match for the world championship in October-November 2003’.

Alas, these efforts were in vain: first my match with Ponomarev collapsed, and then also with the next knock-out champion Kasimdzhanov. I was left in a suspended state and I lost two years of normal life. But Ilyumzhinov again showed that he keenly perceived the mood of the chess elite and officials, who did not want to give me a chance to regain the title. After losing my goal, I began seriously thinking about giving up professional chess. And I decided on this at the age of 41, after victories in the 2004 Russian Championship Super-Final and Linares 2005.

Since the times of the GMA I had been dreaming of organising tournament life and the world championship far more professionally than it is done by FIDE. But my attempts to unite the leading players failed because their sense of cooperative solidarity always receded in the face of internal disagreements. As a result, despite enormous efforts, I was not in fact able to repair the mistake of 1993.

*I should like to express my gratitude to my long-standing trainer Alexander Shkarov, and also to the chess compilers Vladislav Novikov and Yakov Zusanovich, for their help in preparing the manuscript for publication.*

player with truly champion-like playing potential, although without a champion-like stability of results.

Over such a short distance – just six rounds! – any of my three opponents could have been my rival. After obtaining No.1 in the drawing of lots, at the start, to my distress, for the first time in my life I was unable to beat Ivanchuk with White – a draw as early as the 21st move! Meanwhile, Short beat Timman with White and took the lead. But the second round, in which I played Nigel Short, brought a change of leader. That day I was able to make use of something from the extensive analytical knowledge accumulated for our 1993 match. At the time many were surprised by why Short avoided his usual French Defence, and at last something from the submerged part of the iceberg was revealed.

*Game 10*  
**G.Kasparov-N.Short**  
Amsterdam, 2nd Round  
13.05.1994  
*French Defence*

**1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 ♖c3 ♗f6**

Having decided to choose the French, for the moment Nigel does not venture his favourite 3...♗b4 (*Game No.12*), while 3...dxe4 (*Game No.84*) was a move that he hardly ever played.

**4 e5 ♗fd7 5 f4 c5 6 ♗f3**

Later this line occurred quite often in my white games, and on the whole it brought me reasonable results.

**6...♗c6**

6...♗b6 7 ♕e3 a6 is another way of fighting for equality, for example: 8 ♖a4 ♗a5+ 9 c3 cxd4 10 b4 ♗c7 11 ♗xd4 ♖c6 12 ♗d2 ♕e7, or 8 a3 ♗c6 9 dxc5 ♕xc5 10 ♖a4 ♗a5+

11 b4 ♗xa4 12 bxc5 0-0 13 c4 ♗a5+ 14 ♗d2 ♗d8! (Kasparov-Radjabov, Moscow (rapid) 2002).


**7 ♕e3 cxd4**

If 7...♗b6 there follows 8 ♖a4 ♗a5+ 9 c3 and now 9...c4 10 b4! ♗c7 11 g4!? (11 g3 ♕e7 12 ♕h3 is also quite good, Svidler-Bareev, 2nd match game, Elista 1997) 11...b5 12 ♖c5 a5 13 a3 with the prospect of developing an offensive on the kingside (Kasparov-Dreev, Munich (blitz) 1994), or 9...cxd4 10 b4 ♖xb4 11 cxb4 ♕xb4+ 12 ♕d2 ♕xd2+ 13 ♖xd2 g5?! (13...0-0 14 ♕d3 b5 15 ♖b2 ♖b6 and ...♖c4 is better) 14 ♗b1! gxf4 15 ♕b5 ♗b8? 16 ♖c5, and White won (Short-Timman, played in the first round!).

7...a6 was also tried against me, for example: 8 ♗d2 (once, mixing up my moves, I played 8 h4?!, Kasparov-Ivanchuk, Frankfurt (rapid) 1998) 8...b5 9 a3! (9 h4 ♕b7 10 h5 ♕e7 is less good, Kasparov-Bareev, Dortmund 1992) 9...♗b6 10 ♖e2! (10 ♗f2!?) 10...c4 11 g4 h5 12 gxh5 ♗xh5 13 ♖g3 ♗h8 14 f5, seizing the initiative (Kasparov-Radjabov, Linares 2003).

**8 ♖xd4 ♕c5** (after 8...♗b6 9 ♗d2 ♗xb2 10 ♗b1 ♗a3 11 ♕b5 White has good play for the pawn, but modern practice shows that Black can defend) **9 ♗d2**

One of the French *tabiyas*.



**9...0-0**

The most popular continuation. 9...a6 comes to the same thing after 10 0-0-0 (10  $\text{c}2$   $\text{e}7$ ?, Svidler-Short, Dubai (rapid) 2002) 10...0-0 (10... $\text{d}4$  11  $\text{e}4$  0-0 allows 12  $\text{xc}5$ !  $\text{xc}5$  13  $\text{d}4$ , then  $\text{b}1$ ,  $\text{d}3$ ,  $\text{he}1$ , g2-g4 and f4-f5, J.Polgar-Short, Buenos Aires 2000) 11 h4, etc.

Another well-trodden path is 9... $\text{e}4$  10  $\text{e}4$   $\text{d}4$  11  $\text{xd}4$   $\text{b}6$ . We looked closely at the endgame after 12  $\text{xb}6$   $\text{xb}6$ , and here instead of 13  $\text{b}5$   $\text{e}7$  14 0-0-0  $\text{d}7$  with equality (Chandler-Short, Hastings 1988/89), I was attracted by 13 a4!? (Kasparov-Bareev, Novgorod 1997).


In addition, there was the gambit idea 12  $\text{d}2$ !  $\text{xb}2$  (12... $\text{c}5$  13 0-0-0  $\text{d}7$  14  $\text{d}4$  a6 15 h4 and  $\text{h}3$  is not so critical, Kasparov-Timman, Horgen 1995) 13  $\text{b}1$   $\text{a}3$  14  $\text{b}5$   $\text{xa}2$  15  $\text{d}6+$   $\text{e}7$ , and since after 16  $\text{b}4$  a5! White only has perpetual check (Shirov-Bareev, Monte Carlo (rapid) 2003), I was intending 16  $\text{d}1$ , but after 16...b6 17  $\text{d}3$   $\text{a}5$ ! Black is okay (Almasi-Bareev, Monte Carlo (rapid) 2003). Therefore it is better to play 16  $\text{c}1$ !  $\text{b}2$  17  $\text{e}2$  (Grischuk-Zvjaginsev, Mainz (rapid) 2005), or 16...b6 17  $\text{e}2$ !  $\text{a}5$  18 c3 (Carlsen-Prasca, Turin Olympiad 2006) with sufficient compensation for the pawn.

**10 0-0-0**

Castling suggests itself, but the prophylactic move 10 g3 is also possible, for example: 10... $\text{e}7$  11 0-0-0  $\text{b}6$ ! 12  $\text{b}3$ !  $\text{xe}3$  13  $\text{xe}3$   $\text{d}7$  14  $\text{b}1$  with some advantage for White (Kasparov-Shirov, Astana 2001).

**10...a6 11 h4**

A fashionable plan at that time. 11  $\text{b}1$  was also played (De Firmian-Short, Manila Interzonal 1990), but 11  $\text{b}3$ ! or 11  $\text{f}2$ ! is objectively better (an example: Kramnik-Radjabov, Linares 2003).

**11... $\text{d}4$  12  $\text{e}4$  b5****13  $\text{h}3$ !**

13  $\text{b}1$  would have led to a position from the De Firmian-Short game, in which after 13... $\text{b}7$  14 h5 b4 15  $\text{e}2$  a5 16  $\text{xc}5$ !  $\text{xc}5$  17  $\text{d}4$   $\text{e}4$  18  $\text{e}3$  White gained a small advantage. However, already then it was known that the immediate 13...b4! 14  $\text{a}4$  (14  $\text{e}2$  a5) 14... $\text{e}4$  15  $\text{xd}4$  a5 or 15... $\text{a}5$  16 b3  $\text{b}7$  is more active.

The immediate 13 h5 is more reasonable, but here also after 13...b4 Black can defend: 14  $\text{e}2$  a5 15  $\text{xc}5$   $\text{xc}5$  16  $\text{e}3$   $\text{b}6$  (16... $\text{c}7$ !) 17 f5 a4 18  $\text{b}1$  (Smirin-Lputian, Rostov-on-Don 1993) 18... $\text{c}7$ ! with the idea of ... $\text{e}4$ , or 14  $\text{a}4$   $\text{e}4$  15  $\text{xd}4$   $\text{a}5$ ! (stronger than 15...a5, Nunn-Lputian, Manila Olympiad 1992) 16 b3  $\text{b}7$  17 h6 (the sharp 17 f5?! does not work in view of 17... $\text{c}6$ ! 18 f6 gxf6 19 exf6  $\text{h}8$ !, Gallagher-Barsov, Bern 1994) 17...g6 18  $\text{b}1$  (18 c3?! bxc3 19  $\text{xc}3$   $\text{c}6$  20  $\text{b}2$   $\text{fb}8$  is unfavourable for White) 18... $\text{c}6$  19  $\text{b}2$   $\text{c}5$  with approximate equality.


In playing 13  $\text{h}3$  I was pinning my hopes not on a direct attack, but rather on White's long-term pluses, resulting from his superior pawn structure. It is important above all to hinder ...f7-f6 and the immediate opening of the centre.

**13...b4**

Now 13...♙b7 deserves consideration, since in the event of 14 h5 b4 15 ♖e2 a5 16 ♗b1, instead of the concrete ♙xc5 and ♘d4 (De Firmian-Short) White has made the rather abstract move ♚h3. Equally unclear, double-edged play results from 14 g4 b4 15 ♖e2 a5 16 g5 ♙a6! 17 h5 ♗b6 (Jongsma-Stellwagen, Nijmegen 2002), or 14 a3 ♗e7 (Najer-A.Rychagov, Krasnoyarsk 2007).

**14 ♘a4 ♙xd4 15 ♗xd4**

This position, which first occurred in Nijboer-Luther, (Leeuwarden 1992), was one that I discussed before the 1993 match at a training session in Podolsk with my friend Smbat Lputian, a great expert on the French Defence.



**15...f6?!**


A novelty! The afore-mentioned game went 15...♗a5?! 16 b3 ♙b7 17 c3! ♚fc8 18 ♗b2 bxc3+ 19 ♚xc3 ♚xc3 20 ♗xc3 ♗xc3+ 21 ♘xc3 with a favourable endgame for White, but Black could have complicated the play with 20...♗d8! and ...♚c8 (Nijboer's recommendation 21 ♚c1 ♚c8 22 ♗b4 is ineffective in view of 22...♚xc1! 23 ♗xc1 ♙c6 24 g3 a5 25 ♗d4 ♙xa4 26 ♗xa4 ♘c5 27 ♗d4 ♖e4 28 ♗e3 f5!). Therefore we gave preference to 20 ♘xc3! and came to the conclusion that here White's chances are better.

That is what I was intending to play.

However, Lputian, returning to the position depicted in the diagram, said: 'Here there is the excellent move 15...f6 – White's centre is destroyed, and Black has no particular problems.' When Smbat left, Makarychev and I carefully studied this move and devised an idea, which became our preparation for the London match. But the French did not occur there, and by the will of fate the preparation went into operation seven months later...

To be fair, it should be mentioned that Black has a perfectly acceptable defence – 15...a5! (with the idea of ...♙a6), and if 16 ♙b5 ♚b8 17 ♙d3 not only is 17...♗c7 possible (Fogarasi-Luther, Kecskemet 1993), but also 17...♘b6 18 ♘c5 ♘d7 (Nijboer-M.Gurevich, Essen 2001), or 17...f6 (Langheinrich-Shirov, Bundesliga 2003).

**16 ♗xb4!** (of course, not 16 exf6 ♗xf6 with equality) **16...fxe5**




**17 ♗d6!**

This unexpected interposition promises Black far more problems than the simple-minded 17 fxe5 ♖xe5 18 ♚e3 ♘c6 (Stohl) 19 ♗b6! ♗d6 20 g3 or 18...a5 19 ♗d4 ♘g6 20 ♘b6 with the idea of ♘xc8, in order to obtain a 'Fischer' bishop and put pressure on the e6-pawn.

**17...♗f6**

The only move: after 17...♖f6? 18 ♖xd8 ♜xd8 19 fxe5 Black is simply a pawn down in an endgame. The culminating moment has been reached.



**18 f5!!**

The crux of White's idea. After quickly making this flamboyant move, I decided that matters were practically decided. But years later, when a computer joined the analysis, it transpired that the win was still a long way off.

**18...♗h6+**


Again the only sensible reply. The pawn is taboo: 18...exf5?? 19 ♖xd5+ or 18...♖xf5? 19 ♜f3 ♖g4(g6) 20 ♜xf8+ ♖xf8 21 ♖b6 winning a piece. 18...♖h8? is also bad in view of 19 fxe6 ♖f4+ 20 ♖b1 ♖xf1 21 ♜hd3! e4 22 ♜xd5 e3 23 ♖c3 e2 24 ♖xe2 ♖xe2 25 exd7 (Stohl), or 20...♖xa4 21 b3 ♖g4 22 ♜f3!, exploiting the weakness of the back rank.

And if 18...♜e8?! White is better after 19 fxe6 ♖f4+ 20 ♖b1 ♖xa4 21 exd7 ♖xd7 22 ♖xd7 ♖xd7 23 ♜a3 or 21...♖xd7 22 ♜a3 ♖g4 23 ♖xd5+ ♖e6 24 ♖f3! ♖xh4 25 b3, attacking the weak black pawns, but the unexpected 19 ♖e2! (intensifying the threat of fxe6, since ...♖f4+ and ...♖xa4 no longer works) is more effective: 19...♖xf5 20 ♜f3 ♖g6 21 ♜df1 e4 22 ♜f4 or 19...♜a7 20 fxe6 ♖f8 21 ♜f3 ♖xh4 22 ♜f7! (22 ♖c5!?)

22...♜xf7 23 exf7+ ♖xf7 24 ♖b6 with a powerful attack.

**19 ♖b1 ♜xf5?**

Faced with White's tempestuous assault, Short makes a decisive mistake. 19...♖f6! was far more resilient, for example:



**Analysis Diagram**


1) 20 fxe6? (a tactical oversight) 20...♖e4 21 ♖xd5? (21 ♖b6 really is better) 21...♖d2+ 22 ♜xd2+ ♖xe6! (but not the cooperative 22...♜xf1+(?)) 23 ♜d1 ♜xd1+ 24 ♖xd1 ♖e6 25 ♖c5! given by Makarychev and Knaak) 23 ♖d6 ♖xd2! and wins (Carroll-van Hooff, Internet 2005);

2) 20 ♖b6 (not 20 ♖c5?! ♖h5! 21 ♜e1 exf5) 20...♖e4 21 ♖c7! (21 ♖xe5 ♜xf5 is equal) 21...♜f7 22 ♖c6! ♖b7 23 ♖xe6 ♜d8 24 ♖xh6! (24 ♜hd3 ♖h5 25 g4 ♖xg4 26 ♖c4 ♖c3+! is unclear, Baklanov-van Hoof, Internet 2006) 24...gxf6 25 ♜b3! ♖g7 (25...♜xf5?! is weaker in view of 26 ♖d3 ♖g7 27 ♖xe4! dxe4 28 ♖c1) 26 ♖c1 with a better, although double-edged endgame;

3) 20 ♖xe5! ♖e4 21 ♖d4 (suggested by Stohl, as well as the unclear 21 g4?! ♖f2) 21...♖b7!? (21...♜b8 22 ♖c3! or 21...♜xf5 22 ♖d3! is less good) 22 ♜b3 e5 23 ♖b4, or 21 ♜f3! exf5 (21...♖xd2+?! 22 ♜xd2 ♖xd2 23 a3! favours White) 22 ♖c5 ♖d2+ (22...♖f6 23 g3)

23 ♖a1 ♜c6 (23...♘f3 24 ♜xd5+) 24 ♜c3, in all cases with a continuing initiative, but still far from a win.

Now, however, Black has an extremely difficult position.



### 20 ♜f3!?

After a long think I chose the most flamboyant way to convert my advantage, although in our London analysis 20 ♗e2 was planned, with the assessment '±'. After this it is bad to play 20...♜f4 (my *Informator* move 20...♜f7? is even worse because of 21 ♜f3!) 21 ♜f3! ♜g6 (21...♜xa4? 22 ♜c6) 22 ♜xf4 exf4 23 ♜e1 or 20...♜g6 21 h5! (this is much stronger than Knaak's move 21 g4?! or Stohl's move 21 ♜f3) 21...♜e8 22 ♗g4 ♜f6 23 h6, and there is no way to save the game. Things are also difficult for Black after 20...e4 21 g4 ♜f2 22 g5 ♜g6 23 ♗g4 ♘f8 24 ♘b6 h5 (24...e3?! 25 ♜c1) 25 ♜h2! ♜xh2 26 ♜xh2 hxg4 27 ♘xa8, etc.

### 20...♜xf3


If 20...♜f6? there was the immediately decisive 21 ♜xf5 ♜xf5 22 ♘b6! (far more forceful than the 22 ♗e2 given in *Informator*) 22...♘xb6 23 ♗d3! e4 24 ♜f1!.

### 21 gxf3

'Now the f-file is closed, but White's bishop has gained access to h3' (Stohl).

21...♜f6 (21...♘f7? 22 ♜c6) 22 ♗h3 ♘f7

Of course, not 22...♘f8? 23 ♘b6. Here for the second time in the game I had a solid think, selecting the better of two tempting paths to the goal.



### 23 c4!

A vigorous move, again creating enormous pressure. 23 f4!? ♜e7! (the only chance: 23...exf4? 24 ♜e1! and wins) also suggested itself, for example:

1) 24 ♜c6 ♜b8 25 f5 ♘f8 26 fxe6+! (instead of the *Informator* move 26 ♘c5?!) 26...♗xe6 27 ♗xe6+ ♘xe6 28 ♜xd5, and Black faces a difficult defence;


2) 24 fxe5! ♜xd6 25 exd6 – calculating this variation at the board, I was afraid of the loss of the d6-pawn after 25...♘f6 26 ♘c5 ♜b8 27 ♜e1 ♜b6, but from afar I did not notice the spectacular 28 ♗xe6+! ♗xe6 29 ♜xe6 ♜c6 30 d7 ♜xe6 31 d8♘+!. After 25...♜b8 26 ♜e1 ♘f8 27 ♘c5 Black also has a very difficult endgame (if 27...♜b4 28 d7!, winning a pawn).

In the end I nevertheless preferred to undermine Black's pawn centre from the other wing – I was attracted by an unusual attacking construction.

### 23...dxc4

After 23...d4 the powerful passed c-pawn would have remained alive. And apart from my previous recommendations 24 f4 exf4 25

f1! or 24 c5 ♖e7 with the improvement 25 ♖c6! (Stohl), here 24 ♔g1! g6 (24...♖e7? 25 ♔xg7+) 25 h5 ♖e7 26 ♖c7 is very strong, with the idea of 26...g5 27 c5! or 26...a5 27 f4! and wins. Therefore Short captured the pawn, but he obviously underestimated my reply.



#### 24 ♖c3!

'The knight, for a long time dozing on the edge of the board, suddenly joins the attack!' (Makarychev).

24...♖e7 (24...♖f8? 25 ♖c6!) 25 ♖c6 ♖b8 26 ♖e4 (threatening both ♖d6+ and ♖xe6+) 26...♖b6

There is nothing else: if 26...♖f6?! 27 ♖d6+ ♖g6, then not 28 ♖xc8?? ♖b4!, but simply 28 ♖xc4!.

#### 27 ♖g5+ ♖g8

Black would also have lost after the slightly more resilient 27...♖f8!? 28 ♖xh7+ ♖g8 29 ♖g5 g6 (in *Informator* only 29...♖b7 30 ♖xe6+ ♖h8 31 ♖xb6 or 31 ♖d6! is given) 30 ♖e4! ♖f6 31 ♖d6! (threatening ♖xe6+) 31...♖a4 32 ♖c1(c2) or 32 ♖c6 ♖e7 33 ♖a1!.

28 ♖e4! g6 29 ♖xe5 ♖b7 30 ♖d6! (White is as though driving in nails – he has complete domination) 30...c3 (or 30...♖a4 31 ♖xe6+ ♖xe6 32 ♖xe6) 31 ♖xe6+ ♖xe6 32 ♖xe6 1-0

Black resigned in view of 32...♖c4 33 ♖xc3.

This colourful, energetically conducted game improved my mood. In the third round Short drew with Ivanchuk, whereas I beat Timman with Black and consolidated my lead – 2½ out of 3.

But in the fourth round I was defeated and caught by Ivanchuk. In our game I 'floundered' right from the opening, overlooking a powerful tactical stroke: 1 e4 c5 2 ♖f3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 ♖xd4 ♖f6 5 ♖c3 a6 6 f4 ♖c7 7 ♖f3 g6 8 ♖e3 ♖g7?! (8...b5 9 ♖d3 ♖bd7 is better, Stefansson-Kasparov, Reykjavik (rapid) 1995) 9 h3 e5?! 10 fxe5 dxe5 11 ♖h6! (here my first desire was simply to stop the clock and leave the tournament hall, but I forced myself to play on) 11...♖xh6 12 ♖xf6 0-0 13 ♖d5 ♖a5+ 14 b4 ♖d8? (a nightmare: after 14...♖g7! White does not have such a large plus) 15 ♖e7+ ♖xe7 16 ♖xe7 exd4 17 ♖c4, and on the 39th move Black resigned. It was very painful to lose practically without a fight.

In the fifth round, which was interchanged with the sixth so that no one should have the same colour three times in a row, both leaders won with White: Ivanchuk against Short and I in a Petroff Defence against Timman (cf. Game No.34 in *Kasparov vs. Karpov 1975-1985*, note to White's 12th move). We both reached 3½ out of 5.

The destiny of first place was decided in the last round. Somehow submissively Ivanchuk lost to Timman in a slightly inferior endgame, while I forced a draw after being fiercely attacked by Short – I could even have played for a win, but, on seeing the suffering of my rival on the neighbouring board, I decided not to take a risk.

Despite the successful finish, I was disillusioned with my insipid play in both games with Ivanchuk. However, I did not grieve for long: the very next day Short and I set off to Munich, in order to join battle in a promi-

ment PCA blitz tournament with the participation of 17 grandmasters and – for the first time in history! – the program *Fritz 3/Pentium* (cf. p.210).

### Partial Revenge

Double-Round PCA Super-Tournament in Novgorod (11-26 August 1994): 1-2. **Kasparov** and Ivanchuk – 7 out of 10; 3. Kramnik – 5; 4-5. Shirov and Short – 4; 6. Bareev – 3.

This was the first time that such a major chess event took place in Novgorod – an ancient Russian city, situated 500 km. north-west of Moscow and 200 km. south of St. Petersburg. Together with the PCA, the organisers produced an optimal type of event: six leading grandmasters playing a double-round tournament. There were no doubts about the participation of Kasparov, Short, Ivanchuk and Shirov, but Kramnik agreed to play only after his failure in the summer Candidates matches, while Kamsky, by contrast, declined after his sensational match victories over Kramnik and Anand.

Karpov was also invited. The Novgorod organisers, armed with a high-powered delegation, sought him out in Moscow, but despite all their entreaties the FIDE champion declined the invitation, saying that he would not play in the PCA – ‘*Kasparov’s personal organisation*’. As a result Bareev became the sixth participant. But in any event, for the first time in the history of chess tournaments an average rating of 2700 was exceeded and the 19th category achieved!

Despite the traditional training session and active relaxation by the sea, this tournament was psychologically difficult for me. From the press: ‘*More often than usual Kasparov looked concentrated and detached from everything. Not as powerful as before,*

*there was an energy field surrounding him. It was sensed that he desperately needed to win the tournament: the world champion was clearly unhappy with both his results and his play in recent times.*’

At the start I managed to win with White against Shirov in a rare variation of the English Opening – 1 c4 e5 2 ♖c3 ♙b4 3 ♜d5 ♙e7 4 d4 d6 5 e4 c6 6 ♜xe7 ♚xe7 7 ♜e2, etc. In the second round came a fighting draw with Bareev in a Grünfeld. In the third I aimed for revenge against Ivanchuk, who had beaten me in Amsterdam; I played 1 e4 and obtained a promising position in a Sicilian (cf. Game No.79 in Part II of *Garry Kasparov on Garry Kasparov*, note to Black’s 11th move), but I was unable to develop my initiative – a draw on the 25th move. We both reached 2 out of 3.

In the fourth round, interchanged with the fifth to avoid a player having the same colour three games in a row, I again had White, this time against the 19-year-old Vladimir Kramnik, my ‘1994 bogeyman’. This was a crucial game. When I was preparing for it I felt very nervous, remembering my three recent defeats against Kramnik (in Linares, Moscow and New York), but as soon as the first few moves were made, the concrete chess problems left no place for anxiety.

*Game 11*  
**G.Kasparov-V.Kramnik**  
Novgorod,  
4th Round 16.08.1994  
*Sicilian Defence B33*

**1 e4 c5 2 ♜f3 ♜c6 3 d4 cxd4 4 ♜xd4 ♜f6 5 ♜c3 e5**


In those days Kramnik still had a rather limited opening repertoire and after 1 e4 he

most often employed the Sveshnikov Variation, with which I had a 'difficult relationship'. However, from this game things went well, and here I was able to score a number of notable victories.

**6** ♖db5 **d6** 7 ♙g5 **a6** 8 ♖a3 **b5** 9 ♖d5

At that time this quiet continuation appealed to me more than the sharp 9 ♙xf6 gxf6 10 ♖d5 (*Game No.85*), which brought Ivanchuk success in his game with Kramnik from the first round. Later I analysed both lines a great deal, and I quite successfully played the Sveshnikov Variation as Black.

**9...♙e7** (9...♙a5+ - *Game No.104*) **10 ♙xf6**  
**♙xf6** **11 c3**



**11...0-0**

11...♙b7 (*Game No.13*) occurs comparatively rarely, more frequently - 11...♖e7 12 ♖xf6+ gxf6 13 ♖c2 ♙b7 14 ♙d3 d5, and even more frequently - 11...♙g5 12 ♖c2 ♖b8 13 a4 (13 a3 a5, Kasparov-Kramnik, Frankfurt (rapid) 2000) 13...bxa4 14 ♖cb4 ♖xb4 15 ♖xb4 ♙d7 16 ♙xa6 ♙a5 17 ♙xd6 ♖b6 18 ♙d3 ♙e7 19 ♖d5 ♖xb2 20 0-0 ♙c5 with approximate equality (Leko-Illescas, Madrid 1998; Karjakin-Radjabov, Baku 2008).


**12 ♖c2 ♖b8**

The main line was then and has remained 12...♙g5 (*Game No.49*), not without the influence of my 1994 games.

**13 h4!?**

Instead of the hackneyed 13 ♙e2 ♙g5 14 0-0 a5, etc. After seeing the fresh idea 13 a3 a5 14 h4 followed by 14...g6 15 g3 (15 h5 ♙g5!) 15...♙g7 16 h5 (Shirov-Illescas, Linares 1994), I employed it against Kramnik (Moscow (rapid) 1994), but he confused me with 14...♖e7, and after 15 ♖ce3?! (15 ♖xf6+! is correct - the inclusion of the moves a2-a3 and ...a6-a5 is in White's favour) 15...♖xd5 16 ♖xd5 ♙e6 17 g3 ♙d7 18 ♙g2 ♙d8! Black easily equalised.

When I studied 13 a3 more closely I did not like the reply 13...♙g5!? 14 ♖cb4 ♙b7 or 14 h4 ♙h6. And so here I played 13 h4 immediately.



**13...♖e7?!**

As expected! After 13...g6 14 g3 ♙g7 15 h5 Black's position is also somewhat inferior (15...♙e6 16 ♙h3!, J.Polgar-Illescas, Leon 1996), but later it transpired that 13...♙e7!? (not weakening the kingside) 14 ♖ce3 ♙e6 is safer, with the intention of ...♙d7 and ...♙d8 (Tiviakov-Yakovich, Elista 1997; Karjakin-Yakovich, Sochi 2007).


**14 ♖xf6+!**

A surprise! After the routine 14 ♖ce3?! there would have followed 14...♖xd5 15 ♖xd5 ♙e6 16 g3 ♙d7 with the idea of ...♙d8, by analogy with our Moscow game (see

above). Kramnik appeared to be astonished by the capture on f6: now Black can carry out the thematic ...f6-f5 or ...d6-d5. Yes, in the Sveshnikov Variation it is customary to fight for control of the key d5-point, but it turns out that it is also possible to harass the enemy monarch!

**14...gxf6**

White is at a crossroads. The move h2-h4 and the resource 0-0-0 give him chances of creating an attack on the king. The black knight will no longer feel safe on g6 on account of h4-h5.



**15 ♖d2!?**


My trainers and I also analysed 15 ♔d3?! – I soon employed this novelty against Lautier (Moscow Olympiad 1994), and after 15...d5 (15...f5 16 exf5! favours White, as was confirmed in later practice) 16 exd5 ♖xd5 17 ♘e3 ♗e6 18 ♖h5 Black was demolished in literally a few moves: 18...e4?! 19 ♔c2 b4?! 20 c4 ♖h8 21 0-0-0 f5 22 ♖g5 ♗b6 23 h5 ♗c6?! 24 ♖b1 ♗c5 25 h6 ♗e5 26 ♗h5! ♗g8 27 ♘g4!! 1-0.

A better defence was 18...f5 19 0-0-0 ♖g6 (but not 19...♖h8?! 20 g4! ♖g6 21 ♖g5! f6 22 ♖xg6 hxg6 23 h5 g5 24 ♘xf5, Teichmeister-Volodin, correspondence 1994), although here also after 20 ♗e2! White's chances are better (less is promised by my *Informator*

suggestion 20 ♖g5 f6 21 ♖xg6+ hxg6 22 ♔c2).

**15...♔b7**

We considered this move to be the strongest. If 15...d5, then 16 0-0-0 or 16 ♗d1!?, while if 15...f5 we were planning 16 exf5! (16 ♖g5+ ♖h8 17 ♗f6+ ♖g8 18 0-0-0 ♔e6 is not so clear, Kamsky-Benjamin, San Diego 2004) 16...♘xf5 17 0-0-0, or 16...♔xf5 17 0-0-0 ♗b6 (17...♔xc2 18 ♖xc2!) 18 ♖g5+ ♖h8 19 ♗f6+ ♖g8 20 ♔d3 with prospects of an attack on Black's hole-ridden fortress.



**16 ♔d3?!**


Played in accordance with our analysis: what could be more natural – both development and the defence of the pawn. If 16 0-0-0 ♔xe4 17 ♖xd6 there was the reply 17...♘d5! 18 ♖xa6 ♖c7 with normal play: 19 ♔d3 ♔xd3 20 ♗xd3 ♗b6! 21 ♖a5 ♖b7! 22 ♗xd5 (22 ♖a3 b4!) 22...♗a8 23 ♖xa8+ ♖xa8 24 ♘b4 ♖f8, and White has no more than decent compensation for the queen.

It is unsurprising that no one saw the computer trick 16 ♘e3!, preventing 16...d5? in view of 17 ♘g4. And after 16...♔xe4 (if 16...♖d7, then simply 17 ♔d3) 17 ♘g4 ♖h8 18 ♘xf6 (what a route: ♘g1-f3-d4-b5-a3-c2-e3-g4xf6!) 18...♔g6 19 h5 ♔f5 20 ♔d3 or 20 g4!? White retains an enduring initiative.

**16...d5!**

The point. 16...♔h8? (Campora-Bhend, Bern 1987) is weak in view of 17 ♖h6! ♘g6 (17...♘g8 18 ♖h5 and ♘e3) 18 g3 ♗g8 19 h5 ♘f8 20 0-0-0, then ♘e3, etc.

### 17 exd5 ♖xd5



### 18 0-0-0!

It is not often that queenside castling is encountered in the Sveshnikov Variation, especially with the sacrifice of the a2-pawn. However, for the moment the black king is far more vulnerable...

### 18...e4!

The only correct defence. In *Informator I* gave 18...♖xa2(?) 19 ♖h6(?) e4 20 ♔e2, transposing into a position from the game, but after 19 ♖h3! with the threat of 20 ♗g3+ ♘g6 21 h5 Black is on the verge of defeat.

### 19 ♔e2 ♖xa2

The principled decision. Both 19...♖xd2+ 20 ♗xd2 and 19...♖e5 (Ftacnik) 20 h5! would have left White with somewhat the better chances.

20 ♖h6 (threatening not only ♖xf6, but also ♗h3-g3+) 20...♖e6

Again the best move. After 20...f5? apart from 21 ♗h3 there was also the decisive 21 ♗d7!.


### 21 ♘d4 ♖b6!

Another strong reply. 'Although Kramnik encountered a surprise in the opening (a

new plan with queenside castling), for a long time he defended brilliantly.' (Makarychev).

We were mainly reckoning on 21...♖e5(?) 22 f4! and thought that White had a powerful attack, although at the time we did not see a forced win. A correct and unusual way was suggested by the game Gildardo Garcia-Illescas (Linares 1994), where after 22...exf3 (there is nothing else) 23 ♔d3! ♘g6 24 g3! ♔e4 (24...f5 25 h5!) 25 ♔xe4? ♖xe4 26 h5 ♘e5 27 ♖xf6 ♖e3+ 28 ♔b1 ♘g4 29 ♖f5 ♘h6 Black managed to gain a draw. But in the event of 25 ♗he1! f5 26 ♘xf5! ♖xf5 27 ♔xe4 ♖h3 28 h5 (Stohl) or 26...f2 27 ♗xe4 ♖xf5 28 h5 White would have won a piece and the game.

Kramnik did indeed defend brilliantly, but in so doing he spent much effort and time, which in the end led to severe time-trouble.



### 22 ♗h3

A critical moment. It is clear that after 22 ♔g4?! ♔c8! Black is okay. When thinking about my move, I saw that my opponent was unhappy with his position, and I ascribed this to the consequences of the obvious manoeuvre 22 ♗h3.

But later it transpired that Kramnik was concerned about a pawn advance – 22 g4!? ♔h8 (22...♔c8? 23 ♗hg1 and wins) 23 ♘f5 ♘xf5 24 gxh5, when it is not at all easy for

Black to defend: 24...b4? 25 ♖d7! (with the murderous threats of ♖g1 and ♗h5-g6!) 25...bxc3 26 ♖xb7! and wins, or 24...♗bd8? 25 ♗h5! (or else 25 ♖d7! ♗c8 26 ♗h5!!) 25...♗c8 (25...e3 26 ♗g6! and ♖d7) 26 ♗g6! fxg6 27 ♖d7!! ♗xd7 28 fxg6 ♖f7 29 gx7 ♗d6 30 ♖d1 (30 ♖g1? ♗g4!) 30...♗e7 31 ♖xd7 – a fantastic geometric solution, found on our return from the game.

Makarychev and I did not bother to conceal our discovery from my opponent, and he returned the favour when, a few days later, also during dinner, he demonstrated the correct defence – 24...♖fd8! (24...e3!? 25 ♖hg1 ♖g8 is also acceptable) 25 ♗h5 e3! 26 ♖hg1 ♖xd1+ 27 ♗xd1 ♖g8 28 ♖xg8+ ♗xg8 29 ♗xe3 ♗c6 with a slightly inferior but drawn endgame.


**22...♗h8 23 ♗g4 ♖g8** (23...♗g8?! 24 ♗h5 with the threat of ♗f5) **24 ♗e6?**

Here there are three possibilities (not counting 24 ♗f5?! ♗e6!), but, alas, not one of them leads to the desired goal. I thought for a long time about which piece to place on e6, and in the end I put my knight there, overlooking after 24...♖g6 25 ♗f4 the reply 25...♗d5!. The tempting 24 ♗e6?! would have been parried by 24...♖g6! 25 ♗f4 fxe6! 26 ♗b8+ ♖g8 27 ♗h2 e5 28 ♗c2 ♗g6! (more convincing than the earlier 28...♗xf2) with excellent play for the exchange (29 g3?! b4!).

Apparently, all that remained for White was 24 ♗f5! ♗xf5 (Stohl also suggests 24...♖g7(?), but this is bad because of 25 ♖g3! ♖bg8 26 ♖xg7 ♖xg7 27 ♗xh7! ♖xh7 28 ♗f8+ ♗g8 29 ♗f5 and ♗e7 or ♖d8) 25 ♗xf5 ♗e6 26 ♗f4 ♗e5! 27 ♗xe5 fxe5 28 ♖g3 ♖xg3 29 fxg3 ♖f8 with a drawn endgame.

‘From what went on at that moment in the press centre I can vouch for the enormous difficulties which have to be overcome in finding one’s way through the endless sea of complicated variations’ (Makarychev).

Soon, when powerful analytical programs appeared, everything began to look different.



**24...♖g6!**

Forced. Black would have lost ignominiously after 24...♗g6? 25 h5, 24...♖xg4? 25 ♗g5!, 24...fxe6? 25 ♗xf6+ ♖g7 26 ♖d7!, or 24...♗xf2? 25 ♖f3! ♖g6 26 ♗xg6! etc.

**25 ♗f4 ♖e8?**

Allowing an incredible finale. When Kramnik made this move he had no more than two minutes left on his clock. Of course, like everyone else, he saw the mating variation 25...♖bg8? 26 h5 ♖xg4 27 ♗xf6+ ♖8(4)g7 28 h6 ♗xe6 29 hxg7+ ♖xg7 30 ♖d8+ ♗g8 31 ♖xg8+! ♗xg8 32 ♗d8+, but in the event of 25...♖c8 he was afraid of 26 ♗g5, and after 25...♖a8 and the brilliant exchange of blows 26 ♖d6! ♗d5!, the inferior endgame after 27 ♖xb6 ♗xf4 28 ♗xf4 ♖xg4 29 ♖xf6 etc. (with the rook on e8 the position is equal).

One instinctively wants to move the attacked rook, especially when the last couple of minutes are ticking away. But 25...♗d5! was far stronger – in the press centre this move was discovered very quickly. It would appear that by 26 ♗h5 ♗xe6 27 ♗xg6 White could still have fought for a win, but in a joint analysis after the game Kramnik found

27...♖xg6! 28 ♖xf6+ ♔g8, when it is now Black who is playing for a win: if 29 ♖e3 (29 ♖g3? ♚a5! and wins – Stohl) 29...b4! he has bishop and knight for a rook, while after 29 h5 ♕xh3 30 ♖d6 ♚c5! 31 hxg6 hxg6 32 gxh3 b4 he is a sound pawn to the good.

Therefore I would have had to discard my dangerous illusions and urgently seek a way to save the game, for example: 26 ♖d4!? (26 ♖g5? ♕b3! and wins) 26...b4! (Ftacnik) 27 cxb4 ♖xb4 28 ♖d2 ♖b6 29 ♖g3 or 27...♕a8!? 28 ♕f5 ♖d5! 29 ♖xe4 ♖xb4 30 ♖e2 ♖xg2 31 ♖e3 ♕d5 32 ♖e8+ with desperate hopes of defending – after all, it is rather White who now has the ‘bad’ king.


**26 ♖d6!**

The immediate 26 h5? would have been a blunder in view of 26...♖xg4 27 ♖xf6+ ♔g8 28 ♖h4 ♖xg2 29 ♖h2 ♖g4 30 ♖h4 ♖xe6 31 ♖xe6 fxe6 32 ♖xg4+ ♔f7, when Black has a won endgame.

**26...♖d5!**

Resourceful defence! 26...♖a5? was altogether unsuitable in view of 27 h5! ♖xg4 28 ♖xf6+ ♔g8 29 ♖g5! ♚a1+ 30 ♔c2 ♖a4+ 31 ♔b1 ♖c4 32 h6 with unavoidable mate – Black does not have perpetual check.

But now there occurs one of those miracles, for which we so love chess.



**27 h5!!**

A move of amazing beauty – for the sake of which all this was started! Events develop by force.


**27...♖xf4**

It did not help to play 27...♖xg4 28 ♖xg4 ♖g8 (28...♖xd6 29 ♖g7 mate) 29 ♖xg8+ ♔xg8 30 ♖g3+ ♔h8 31 ♖d8!, 27...♖xe6 (or 27...fxe6 28 hxg6) 28 hxg6 ♖xf4 (28...fxg6 29 ♖h6, and mate) 29 ♖xh7+ ♔g8 30 gxf7+! ♔f8 (30...♔xh7 31 ♖xb6) 31 ♖h8+ ♔xf7 32 ♕xe6+ and ♖xb6, or 27...♖gg8 28 ♖xd5! ♖xe6 29 ♕xe6 ♖xe6 30 ♖d6 (Stohl) or 29 ♖d7!.

**28 hxg6 ♖xd6**

The win is simple after 28...♖xh3 29 gxf7! or 28...♖d3+ 29 ♖hxd3!, to say nothing of 28...♖xe6 29 ♖xh7+ (see above).

**29 ♖xh7+ ♔g8 30 gxf7+ ♔xh7 31 fxe8 ♖xe6 32 ♕f5+ ♔g7 33 ♖g6+ ♔f8 34 ♖xf6+ ♔e8 35 ♕xe6**



**35...♖f8?**

A blunder with the flag about to fall, but the alternatives were equally hopeless: 35...b4 36 ♖f7+ ♔d8 37 ♖xb7 ♖xe6 38 ♖xb4, 35...♕a8 36 g4!, or 35...e3 36 fxe3 ♕xg2 37 ♕f7+! ♔d7 38 ♕e8+! ♔c7 39 ♖g7+ ♔d8 40 ♖xg2 (the simplest) 40...♔xe8 41 ♖e4+ with the exchange of queens on the next move.

**36 ♕d7+ 1-0**