Alexander Alekhine CHESS DUELS 1927 – 1929

163 Games Annotated by Alexander Alekhine

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INTRODUCTION

This is the fourth volume of our project to publish all the available games annotated by the fourth world chess champion Alexander Alekhine – not only his own games, but also games by other players for which he contributed notes in various publications. The first three volumes covered the periods 1893-1920, 1921-1924 and 1924-1926.

In early 1927 the world champion Capablanca agreed to defend his title against Alekhine later that year. A six-player tournament held in New York in February and March was convincingly won by the Cuban, with Alekhine finishing in a distant second place. Alekhine subsequently annotated all the games for a tournament book, first published in German in 1928. A Russian translation appeared in 1930, and a revised edition (1989) has been translated for this present work, thus providing a fresh English version of Alekhine's annotations.

In June/July 1927 Alekhine was victorious in an international tournament in the Hungarian city of Kecskemet. He annotated several of his games for a German tournament book, and these have been translated from the Russian version published in 1929 and reprinted in 1993. Other games from Kecskemet appeared in Alekhine's book *Auf dem Wege zur Weltmeisterschaft*, subsequently published in a Russian translation as *Na puti k vyschim shakhmatnym dostizheniyam*, and this was also the source of the 34 games from his epic world championship match with Capablanca later that year.

After winning the world title Alekhine played in no tournaments for some 18 months, restricting himself to simultaneous exhibitions. His annotations of the best examples from these appeared in various publications, especially the Argentine daily *La Nacion*, along with notable games contested by other players.

In June 1929 Alekhine played in a small tournament in Bradley Beach, and later that year he successfully defended his title against Efim Bogoljubow; he published several games from this match in his *My Best Games of Chess 1924-37*.

We have also included some two dozen games played between 1907 and 1926, which have come to light since the publication of the earlier volumes in this series.

Translator's notes have been given where it was felt appropriate. To avoid encumbering the text these have been inserted, with suitable cross-references, at the end of the book.

New York International Tournament, 19 February – 23 March 1927*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	Total
1 Capablanca		11/21/21/2	11/211/2	1/21/211/2	1/21/211/2	11½1	14
2 Alekhine	01/21/21/2		1/2011/2	1/21/21/21/2	1½1/21	1/211/21	111/2
3 Nimzowitsch	01/201/2	1/2101/2		100½	111/21/2	1½1/21	101/2
4 Vidmar	1/21/201/2	1/21/21/21/2	0111/2		1/21/21/21/2	1/2011/2	10
5 Spielmann	1/21/201/2	01/21/20	001/21/2	1/21/21/21/2		1/21/211/2	8
6 Marshall	001/20	1/201/20	001/21/2	1/2101/2	1/21/201/2		6

First Round

Game 1

J. R. Capablanca – R. Spielmann

New York 1927 (1) Queen's Gambit D38

1 d4 d5 2 \$\tilde{9}\$ f3 e6 3 c4 \$\tilde{9}\$ d7

Lasker's move, the idea of which, in my opinion, consists not much in the subsequent SO development of the bishop at b4 together with ...c7-c5 (as Vidmar and Spielmann eagerly played in New York), but rather in preparing the Cambridge Springs Variation and preventing the opponent from playing the fashionable variation (after 3... \bigcirc f6) with 4 \bigcirc g5 and 4)bd2.

It was with the same aim that I employed the move 3... 47 in the 7th game of my match with Capablanca in Buenos Aires.


4 cxd5 exd5 5 **2**c3 **2**gf6

If White wanted to take the game into this variation, he should

first have played 4 ②c3 and to 4...②gf6 replied 5 §g5 (as in the following Alekhine-Vidmar game); now with 5...c6 Black could have completely neutralised the following pin.

Such slight inaccuracies in the playing of the opening and are not uncommon in Capablanca's games.

6 **£g5**



6...**≜b4**(?)

Spielmann wants without fail to play the dubious variation with the counter-pin, which he – by his own admission – thoroughly analysed with Vidmar on the way to New

York.

However, in the given position this plan seems illogical: indeed, the bishop move is usually made with the aim by tactical threats of forcing a clarification of the position in the centre (c4xd5, e6xd5). But since the opponent himself has earlier already voluntarily gone in for such a clarification, by playing 6...c6 followed by ...\$e7, ...0-0, ...\$E8 and ... 18 etc. Black could have set up a position that has long been known to be quite safe for him.

7 ₩b3

Not an especially good idea although, of course, even after this move White does not yet have an inferior game. But if he definitely wanted to move his queen, then 7 ₩a4 (as was played in the 13th round between the same opponents) would have been more advisable. However, I don't think that White was forced to resort to such artificial manoeuvres, and by simply playing for further development (e2-e3, \(\delta\)d3, 0-0) he would have more firmly retained the advantage of the first move.

7...c5!

This move is perfectly correct, since Black is threatening an immediate counterattack with ... a5 etc., whereas White is short of a tempo to safeguard his king by castling kingside.

8 a3 \(\preceq\)xc3+

Now after 8... ₩a5 an adequate answer would have been 9 \(\partial d2!\)

9 ₩xc3

9 bxc3 was more in the spirit of the position, since in the resulting position it would have been much harder for Black to exploit his queenside pawn majority than after the move in the game.


9...c4!

The point of this good move is that now White cannot play 10 e4 on account of 10... 2xe4.

10 ₩e3+

Comparatively best.

10... ******e7 11 ******xe7+ *****xe7



12 5)d2?

It is only after this timid move that White's game becomes definitely worse. After the rather obvious 12 e4 the two sides' chances would have been roughly equal, for example: 12...dxe4 13 ②e5 h6 (13...b5 14 a4) 14 ②xf6+ ②xf6 15 ③xc4 etc.

12...h6! 13 **\$**h4

If 13 \(\hat{2}\)xf6+ \(\hat{2}\)xf6 14 e4, then after 14... \(\hat{2}\)xe4 15 \(\hat{2}\)xe4 dxe4 16 \(\hat{2}\)xc4 \(\bat{2}\)d8 17 d5 (or 17 \(\bat{2}\)d1 \(\hat{2}\)g4) with 17... \(\hat{2}\)d6 Black would have


blocked the opponent's passed pawn and then exploited his pawn majority on the kingside.

13...b5 14 e4

A sad necessity: otherwise, the advance of the black pawns would have technically decided the game very easily.

14...g5 15 **Qg3 Axe4** 16 **Axe4** dxe4 17 a4

Of course, the only possibility of preventing the reinforcement of the opponent's pawn chain by ... a7-a6.



17...**≜a6?**

Up to here Spielmann has played excellently; now by 17...f5! he could have maintained his material advantage and gained excellent winning chances.

In this case Capablanca (as well as Tartakower, in the Russian tournament book) suggests the following variation: 18 \$\mathref{L}\$c7 \$\mathref{L}\$a6 19 h4 \$\mathref{L}\$hc8 20 \$\mathref{L}\$a5 g4 21 h5! with drawing chances for White.

However, I think that Black should make the move ...g5-g4,

devaluing his pawn formation, only in the case of extreme necessity, and since at the moment there is no such necessity, he should play 20... If 6!, in order (in the event of 21 hxg5 hxg5) to neutralise the actions of the white rooks on the h-file by ... If 7-g6 or in some cases ... Ih8.

After the move in the game, by various tactical threats White gains the opportunity to achieve a harmonious action of all his pieces and with accurate play he obtains the desired draw.

18 axb5 **Qxb5** 19 b3! **Zhc8**

After his error on the 17th move Black no longer has time for ...f7-f5.

20 h4 a6

In surprising fashion after 20...g4 White also gains adequate counter-resources: 21 单2 f5 (or 21...h5) 22 罩a5! a6 23 bxc4 单xc4 24 单d2! etc.

21 bxc4 \(\precent{L}\)xc4 22 hxg5 hxg5 23 \(\precent{L}\)h6!


With the terrible threat of 24 \(\hat{2}\)d6+.

23...**£**)f6

Not 23...f6 on account of 24 ②xc4 □xc4 25 □h7+ ③e6? 26 d5+ and wins.

24 罩a5!

Threatening 25 \(\hat{\omega}\)xc4 followed by \(\beta = 5+\). The attack by the rooks from both flanks is interesting.



An admission that Black is already reconciled to a draw. And indeed, he can no longer extract anything more from the position: if, for example, 24... 24, then 25 \$\frac{1}{2}b6 \frac{1}{2}xf1 \frac{1}{2}b7 + \frac{1}{2}e8 \frac{1}{2}2 \frac{1}{2}ac8 \frac{1}{2}2 \frac{1}{2}ac8 \frac{1}{2}2 \frac{1}{2}ac8 \frac{1}{2}2 \frac{1}{2}ac8 \f

25 **&xb5 axb5 26 基xb5! 基a1+ 27 含d2 基a2+**

It would have been bad to play 27...e3+ 28 fxe3! ②e4+ (or 28...罩a2+ 29 鸷d3) 29 鸷d3 ②xg3 30 罩b7+ followed by 罩h8+ and 罩xc8.


Capablanca once again showed himself to be a brilliant tactician, as he very skilfully saved a strategically bad game.

28 \$\d1 \boxeda1+

Draw agreed.

Game 2 A. Alekhine – M. Vidmar New York 1927 (1) Queen's Gambit D38

1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 🖾 f3 🖾 d7 4 🖾 c3 🖄 gf6 5 🚊 g5 🚊 b4 6 cxd5 exd5 7 e3



7...0-0

Up to the last move this variation has frequently been employed, in particular Spielmann. But here it would seem that only 7...c5 is in accordance with the sharp bishop sortie on the 5th move. Then White would be forced to play a gambit, with all its advantages and drawbacks: 8 2d3 c4 9 &c2 \widetilde{\pi}a5 10 0\to 0 \&xc3 11 bxc3 \widetilde{\pi}xc3 and now 12 \widetilde{\pi}b1 or 12 □b1. Both these moves make it dubious for Black to castle, for example: 12 \bullet b1 0-0 13 e4! dxe4 14 \$\d2 \wdot\dag{a}3 15 \$\dag{b}4 \wdot\dag{a}6 16 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xf8 exf3, and now, of course, not 17 ⊈e7? ₩e6, as played in the game Maroczy-Tenner (New York Club Tournament 1926), but 17


After the inaccurate move in the game White also obtains a good attack, but without the need to sacrifice anything.

8 **≜d3** c5 9 0−0 **≜xc3** 10 bxc3 c4 11 **≜c2 ₩a5**

Now with 12 \(\subseteq b1\) White could have tried to take the play into variations similar to those given in the previous note, but the knight move is even more effective.

12 De5!

The exchange of the c3-pawn for the h7-pawn planned with this move disrupts Black's kingside far more than it may seem at first sight. Therefore, it would now have been more prudent for Black to decline the Greek gift and play 12... \$\mathbb{Z}\$e8, with the possible continuation 13 \$\mathbb{Q}\$xd7 \$\mathbb{Z}\$xd7 \$14 \$\mathbb{Z}\$d2 (14...b5 15 a4), after which White would nevertheless retain the better chances.



12... **營xc3** 13 **營xd7 營xd7**

Of course, 13...\(\delta\)xd7 14 \(\delta\)xf6

followed by \(\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned}

14 ₩b1!

The point of White's 12th move: in view of the strong threat of 15 全e7 星e8 16 单b4 Black does not have time to save his h-pawn.

14... **Ee8** 15 **\$\partial xh7+ \partial h8** 16 **\$\partial c2**

Despite the opponent's superiority on the queenside, White's advantage is obvious, and Vidmar, for all his ingenuity, is unable to find an adequate defence against the numerous threats (17 e4, 17 a4).

16...**约f8**

If 16... 4b6, then simply 17 a4 etc.

17 **臭a4!**

This leads to the win of a pawn with an excellent position; the rest should essentially have been merely a matter of technique.


17...罩e6

Forced.

18 **營b5!**

This is the correct continuation, rather than 18 \(\septimes f5 \) f6!.

Of course, this is quite sufficient, but 19 £f4! was more accurate, after which it would have been very difficult for Black to find anything.



19...**₩b**4!

Very subtle: Black defends b7 and f8, attacks the bishop on a4 and with 20... £e6 creates an obvious threat to the other bishop. But White has a convenient way of parrying all the threats.

Of course, not 21 \$\mathbb{\text{\tin}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi{\text{\texi{\texi{\text{\text{\texi{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\tet

21...f5 22 \(\text{\mathscr{@}}\)f4

22...②h7 23 h4

This shielding was planned on the previous move. However, 23 单h4 罩g4 24 營e5 was also perfectly good.

23... 🖾 xg5 24 hxg5 \@e7 25 \@h4+

White tries to force the rook to occupy an even more unfavourable position, but he thereby gives his opponent an opportunity to prolong the resistance (cf. the note to White's 30th move). 25 Wh2+

\$\displays g8 26 f4 with the threat of e3-e4 was much simpler.

25... 国h6 26 豐g3 国h5 27 f4

27 營e5 was hardly any stronger in view of 27... 罩d8!

27...₩a3!


In this way Black creates the greatest practical difficulties for his opponent.

28 \(\psi\)f3 g6 29 e4!

The simplest, since now White forces a won endgame. 29 罩ab1 was not so clear on account of 29...罩d8!

29... **当b2 30 exf5**

By no means an oversight, as certain critics consider, but a continuation of the manoeuvre begun with the preceding moves. Nevertheless, 30 \(\vec{\psi} f2\) was simpler, and if 30...\(\vec{\psi} g7\) (in order to prepare ...\(\vec{\psi} ah8\)), then 31 \(\vec{\psi} d1!\) with an easy win.



Now, at last, the position has clarified: Black is forced to exchange the queens and must soon allow the opponent to create

two passed pawns. Unfortunately for White, with his next move he deviates from his initially intended plan, leading to a win.

31...\delta xf2+32 \delta xf2


This striving to win a pawn, which in the resulting rook endgame could not play any role (as a counter-chance for Black) deprives White of an undoubtedly deserved win. After 32 \(\frac{1}{2}xf2 \) \(\frac{1}{2}xf5 \) (if 32...gxf5, then 33 \(\frac{1}{2}e1 \), and Black loses due to the bad position of his bishop) 33 g4! \(\frac{1}{2}xg4 \) 34 \(\frac{1}{2}xg6 \) \(\frac{1}{2}h3 \) 35 \(\frac{1}{2}e4 \) \(\frac{1}{2}b8 \) 36 f5 Black would very soon come to realise that further resistance was hopeless.

Thanks to the threats of \$\mathbb{\mathba\mto}\mathba{\mathbb{\mathba{\mathbb{\mathba\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\

34... 国h7 35 国d5

Since now the opponent could not double rooks on the h-file, White should have tried his last chance with 35 g4! fxg4 36 \diggreg g3 etc.

35... **三**c8! 36 **三**f5 **三**d7 37 **三**e5 c3 38 **三**c1 c2 39 **三**e2 **三**dc7 40 **含**f3 b5 41 f5 **含**g7



42 **ℤe6**

With this move White indicates his readiness to conclude matters peacefully, since the powerful black pawn on the 2nd rank makes any serious winning attempt fruitless. If, for example, 42 \$\ding*f4\$, then simply 42...\$\ding*c4+\$, and now in the event of the rook exchange after 44...\$\ding*c3!\$ and ...b5-b4 White would end up in a dangerous position.

42...罩d7

If 42... \(\begin{aligned} \text{If } 42... \(\begin{aligned} \text{If } \text{Simplest is } 43 \) \(\begin{aligned} \text{If } 42... \(\begin{aligned} \text{If } \text{Simplest is } 43 \) \(\begin{aligned} \text{If } \text{Simplest is } 43 \) \(\begin{aligned} \text{If } \text{Simplest is } 43 \) \(\begin{aligned} \text{If } \text{Simplest is } 43 \) \(\begin{aligned} \text{If } \text{Simplest is } 43 \) \(\begin{aligned} \text{If } \text{Simplest is } \text{Simplest is } 43 \) \(\begin{aligned} \text{If } \text{Simplest is } \te

43 **Ee2 Edc7** 44 **Ee6 Ed7** 45 **Ee2** Draw agreed.

Game 3 F. Marshall – A. Nimzowitsch New York 1927 (1) French Defence C01

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 **\$b4** 4 exd5 exd5 5 ②f3

With this move White deprives himself of any hint of an opening advantage, and even more than that: by exchanging at a convenient moment on c3, Black gains chances of creating an enduring weakness in White's position, in the form of doubled pawns.

Therefore the immediate 5 \(\ddot\)d3 is more often played.


5... 2 e7 6 & d3 4 bc6 7 h3

If immediately 7 0–0, then 7... \(\delta g4\) would have been not very pleasant for White. The difference in the development of the kings' knights turns out to be not in White's favour.

7...**≜e6**

Encouraged by the opponent's poor actions in the opening, Nimzowitsch rejects the natural exchanging manoeuvre 7... £15 in favour of complicated and interesting, although not altogether correct play.

8 0–0 \delta d7



9 **臭f4**

9 ©e2 was simpler, with a roughly equal game. However, the move in the game should not be condemned – it even promises

good practical results, since it prompts the opponent to engage in risky experiments.

9...**≜**xc3

Over the past few years play against doubled semi-centre pawns has become one of Nimzowitsch's favourite strategic motifs; such positions, which he is able to obtain from various openings, are played Nimzowitsch with by particular virtuosity. However, in the given instance he is not on the right lines, since the insecure position of his own king should subsequently have prevented him from exploiting the weak points in the opponent's camp. With 9... 单d6 he could, of course, have easily equalised.

10 bxc3 f6

A necessary accompaniment to the previous move: since he no longer has his king's bishop, the dark squares must if possible be defended by pawns, but now the e6-square is weakened.


11 罩b1 g5 12 臭g3 0-0-0

The king itself takes on the defence of the b7- and c7-pawns.

Generally speaking, the role of the king in defence (after the risky attempts by the ageing Steinitz to use this piece for attacking aims with the board full of pieces suffered a dismal fiasco) was for a long time seriously underestimated, and only the post-war period has brought changes in this respect (cf., for example, the games from the match in Buenos Aires, where already in the middlegame the kings served to cover squares in the region of a breakthrough, i.e. before the endgame they performed as active pieces).

Of course, Black's last few moves, by their spontaneity and to some extent novel strategy, make the most favourable impression on anyone who believes in evolution and deepening of chess thinking. Therefore it becomes almost annoying when on closer examination of the position it transpires that this plan is not only not the best, but after correct (and by no means very sophisticated) counterplay by the opponent it could even have placed Black in a highly unenviable position.

In view of this, instead of 11...g5 it would really have been better to choose the modest 11...\(\int\)d8 followed by ...0-0.



13 ₩e2?

The opponent's boldness unsettles Marshall, and he commits – now and subsequently – a series

of hardly reparable inaccuracies. For example, instead of the queen move (associated only with the crude threat of 14 \(\pmaa6\), which Black easily parries), a less routine plan of attack, beginning with 13 2/21, was appropriate; if now, say, 13... ②b8, then 14 ②b3 b6 15 豐e2 - on this occasion with genuinely unpleasant threats. Therefore after 13 © d2 Black's best would have been to reply 13... a5, with the aim of exchanging the enemy knight on its way to c5. However, despite the fact that this exchange would have again repaired White's pawn formation on the queenside, demonstrated and hence inadequacy of the plan begun with 9... ≜xc3, in this case there would be no necessity for White to play 14 \(\Gamma \) b3 immediately; instead of this 14 Wc1 is very good (and the knight move. It is easy to see that with such a plan White would have gained an enduring initiative. But now, on the contrary, he gradually encounters difficulties.

13...罩de8!

A defence (vacating the d8-square for the flight of the king) and simultaneously a counter-attack.

14 \(\bar{2}\) fe1

If 14 **&**a6, then 14...bxa6 15 **※**xa6+ **&**d8 16 **基**b7 **②**f5! 17 **基**xc7 **※**xc7 18 **&**xc7+ **&**xc7 with an easy win.


14...**2**f5 15 **\$xf5**(?)

It is only with the absence of

this bishop that White's queenside pawns really become weak – and this promises White a cheerless endgame. Despite the obvious danger, 15 \$\oldsymbole{\omega}h2\$ offered better chances.

The decisive mistake, allowing Black to create a solid defensive position on the queenside with gain of tempo.

By playing 17 \$\mathbb{\text{\mathbb{G}}} a5!\$ (if 17...\delta b8, then 18 c4!, and the resulting complications are not unfavourable for White) Marshall could for the moment have prevented this.



17...b6 18 ₩a3 �b7 19 ₩b3

The tragedy begins: it is hardly possible to defend the c2-pawn in any other way.

19...\$\c6 20 \d2


On the 13th move this would have been the start of a highly promising attack, whereas now it is a modest defence against the threatened invasion of the black knight at c4. The storm clouds are

gathering.

The double exchange of rooks is associated with a purely tactical idea (to say nothing of the fact that Black does not need these pieces for the conversion of his advantage): Black eliminates the threat of ②c5+ (after ②b3) and thereby avoids the otherwise obligatory exchange of knights.

23 **罩xe8 豐xe8 24 豐b1**

What could be done? For example, after 24 \$\displaystyle{\psi}f1\$ the reply 24...\$\displaystyle{\psi}a4\$ would have been very strong.



24...\$c8(?)

Black was obviously in time-trouble, otherwise it is inexplicable why he did not play 24... e2!, when after 25 e1 White would have been in a stalemated position, while in the event of 25 b3 c4 26 c5+ ec8 27 dd3 dd2! Black would have gained a material advantage, retaining an attack.

25 \d\d\d\d\evergee e6

25...營c6 was also strong. 26 公b3 公c4 27 公d2 公a3 28 公f1 公xc2

In view of the opposite-colour bishops, White could perhaps have reconciled himself to the loss of this pawn, were it not for the organic weakness of his queenside. As it is, he can only wait for the opponent to land the fatal blow.


After 32 \(\subseteq c1 \) \(\subseteq e1!\) White would have gradually died of suffocation.

32... \(\) xe2 33 f4 \(\) a3 34 fxg5 fxg5 35 \(\) f2

Otherwise 35... 5b5 followed by ... \$\dd{1}d3.

35...\$h5 36 \$e5 g4 37 hxg4

The exchange of pawns is desirable only for Black, since on the other wing he has material sufficient for a win. Therefore from the practical point of view 37 h4 was more advisable.



39...≜e6!


Threatening by 40... 55 to win a pawn; this would have been premature immediately on account of the possible reply c3-c4. White, obviously in time-trouble (the 40th move!), does not notice the threat, after which the endgame does not cause the opponent any problems.

However, Black would also have won after 40 堂d3!, for example: 40...堂d7 41 皇f8 皇f5+42 堂e3 ②c2+ 43 堂f4 皇g6 44 堂e5 ②e3.

40 **\$f8? 5b5** 41 **5b1** a5

41...\$f5 was also possible, since if 42 a4 \$\delta xb1\$ 43 axb5, then Black, by playing most simply ...\$d7 followed (in the event of \$\delta f4-e5) by ...c7-c6, after the exchange of pawns would have invaded with his king on c4.

42 \(\psi d2 \) \(\psi f5 \) 43 \(\infty a3 \) \(\infty xa3 \) \(\psi b1 \) 45 \(\psi f8 \) \(\psi xa2 \)



Marshall could have calmly saved himself the following 15 moves.

46 g7 gc4 47 e3 e3 eb7 48 gh6 ea6 49 ed2 gf1 50 g3 eb5 51

ਊc1 ਊc4 52 ਊb2 c5 53 Ձe3 cxd4 54 Ձxd4 b5 55 Ձb6 a4 56 Ձa5 d4! 57 cxd4 b4 58 Ձb6 a3+ 59 ਊa2 ਊb5 60 Ձc5 ਊa4

White resigned.

Second Round

Game 4 A. Nimzowitsch – J. R. Capablanca New York 1927 (2) Oueen's Gambit D30

1 c4 45 f6 2 45 f3 e6 3 d4 d5 4 e3

As is well known, here the moves $4 \ 205$ and $4 \ 20c3$ are more energetic and therefore the soundest for development. But against Capablanca in New York they played as though in games with him they had pledged to make not the best moves, but at the least second-rate ones.

4...**≜e7 5 ②bd2**

Why such artificiality? Everything else (5 ②c3; 5 এd3) would have been more natural and more active in the battle for the centre.

5...0-0 6 **≜**d3


More in keeping with the previous move would have been the flank development of the queen's bishop (6 b3) or first 6 \(\dot\)e2.

6...c5 7 dxc5

Even now 7 b3 followed by \$\mathref{2}\$b2 would have given a reasonable game with chances for both sides. The move played should have led to a rapid simplification of the situation.

7...**②a6**

A good move, which, however, leads only to an equal game.



8 0-0?

This is already a real mistake, after which the opponent gains domination over the whole board. Of course, it was essential to play 8 ②b3 dxc4 (8...②xc5 9 ②xc5 營a5+10 奠d2 營xc5, then 11 區c1 is more to the advantage of White) 9 奠xc4 營xd1+10 營xd1 ②xc5 11 ②xc5 奠xc5 12 營e2 with equality.

8... 2xc5 9 \(\) e2 b6 10 cxd5?

This systematic assisting of the opponent's development, with a loss of time and space moreover, is equivalent to positional suicide. 10 b3 should still have been played. White rejects this possibility for so long, that in the end, because of his queen's bishop being shut in, he finds himself in a lost position.

10... 2xd5 11 2b3 2b7 12 2xc5

≜xc5 13 ₩a4


And now he aims to exchange his already developed bishop, leaving the other one peacefully asleep! In this game Nimzowitsch is truly unrecognisable...

13 **å**d2 **增**f6 14 **增**b3 (14...e5 15 **å**c3 etc.) really was better.

13... **營f6!**

Black correctly, acts not opponent preventing the from carrying out his plan, which involves a further loss of time (the exchange on a6 could easily have been prevented by 13...a6), but merely aims to hinder development of the bishop on c1. A sound plan in the spirit of the position, which, however, he does not conduct with the appropriate accuracy.

14 **& a6 & xa6** 15 **\(\mathbb{\mathbb{W}} \) xa6**



15...**约b4(?)**

This knight manoeuvre, which would appear to have been calculated rather superficially, leads only to an exchange, easing the opponent's position. Simple and strong was 15... If d8 followed by ... e6-e5-e4, after which White would hardly have been able to resist for long.


16 營e2 罩fd8 17 a3

Better than 17 ②e1, after which the simple doubling of rooks would have been very strong (17... 3d7).

17...公d3 18 公e1 公xe1 19 罩xe1 罩ac8 20 罩b1 營e5

This queen which move, provoked such admiration, should have achieved as little as any other one; all Black's main advantage was lost by his unfortunate knight manoeuvre. However, now it was bad for White to play 21 b4 in view of 21...\$d6 22 g3 We4 followed by rook invasion. But subsequently White had a simpler way out.

21 g3



This new, very sensitive weakening of the light squares could hardly have been avoided. After the natural move 21 \(\preceq\$d2 Black would have gained the advantage as follows: 21...\(\preceq\$d6 22

21...\delta'd5!

Correct, since it provokes a further weakening in White's position.

However, Capablanca is incorrect in asserting (in his notes written for the English tournament book) that with 21... 營e4 he could have won a pawn. The point is that after 22 总d2 Black could not have played 22... 急xa3? due to the lack of an escape square for his king: 23 bxa3 冨c2 24 冨bc1! 冨b2 25 冨ed1 營d5 26 e4! 營d7 27 兔b4! and wins.

22 b4 臭f8 23 臭b2 營a2!

With the unpleasant threat of 24...a5.

24 \(\bar{a} a 1 ?

A bad, and also temporary measure. The position could have been defended with 24 \(\beta\)bd1!, for example:


- 2) 24...a5 25 \(\bar{Z}xd8 \) \(\bar{Z}xd8 \) 26 \(\dd{Q}d4! \) with sufficient counterchances.

Even here 25 \(\beta\) ac1 was still possible, with variations similar to those given above.

The d4-square cannot be firmly occupied by the bishop, in view of the constant threat of ...e6-e5.

25... **罩c2 26 豐a6?**

After this the game is definitely lost (it is simply amazing how many weak moves White had to make, in order to reach this result). Although White's position was rather bad, after 26 \(\mathbb{\math




26...e5!

The start of an energetic concluding attack, which to some extent makes up for the mutual errors in the preceding part of the game.

There is a pretty 'main variation': 28 罩fl 灃xe3! (like many problems and studies, here also there is a secondary solution — 28...灃d5 followed by ...灃f3) 29 食f4 罩xf2! with a quick mate.

And 28 \(\setminfty\)f1 would no longer have saved White, for example: 28...\(\setwinfty\)d5 29 \(\delta\)d4 \(\setwinfty\)h5! (this move, suggested by Capablanca, is stronger than 29...\(\setwinfty\)f3, to which it

is still possible to reply 30 \(\text{\mathbb{Z}}ac1 \) 30 h4 (otherwise 30...Rxf2, with an advantage in pawns sufficient for a win) 30...\(\text{\mathbb{E}}f3 \) with crushing threats.



30...罩xh2!

31 營f3 罩hg2+ 32 營xg2 罩xg2+ 33 含xg2 營xg4

The rest is very simple.

White resigned.

Game 5

R. Spielmann – A. Alekhine

New York 1927 (2) Sicilian Defence B40

1 e4 c5 2 ②f3 e6 3 d4 cxd4 4 ②xd4 ②f6 5 \(\) \(\) d3

After this move Black, in my

opinion, easily equalises. More chances are given by 5 ②c3, but this is also sharper in view of Black's possible pressure on the c-file.

5... © c6 6 © xc6

After 6 \(\extrm{\pmathbe{e}} e3 \) quite adequate is 6...d5 7 \(\extrm{\pmathbe{o}} d2 \) e5! with good equalising chances.

6...dxc6


After 6...bxc6 the continuation 7 We2 followed by 0–0 and c2-c4! would have been unpleasant for Black.

7 2 d2

This knight, the development of which at c3 did not hold any prospects, heads for more promising squares. However, it is clear that this try does not set Black any problems.

7...e5 8 ②c4 皇c5! 9 皇e3 Not 9 ②xe5? 變d4 etc.

9... 2 xe3 10 2 xe3 2 e6 11 0-0 0-0



Black's game is now slightly better – mainly on account of the threat to the e4-pawn, which also restricts somewhat the scope of the white pieces. However, in view of the almost inevitable exchange of the rooks on the only open file, a quick draw should have been expected.

Unfortunately, it is not easy for Black to double rooks on the d-file, since 14... \$\begin{aligned} \pmathbb{2} d7 & \pmathbb{c} c4! \text{ would be rather to White's advantage.} \end{aligned}\$

15 \(\bar{2}\) ac1 a5

Otherwise 16 b4.

16 **å**b1 g6

If immediately 16...a4, then 17
Zxd8
Zxd8
Ad1
Zxd1+ 19
Wxd1, and if 19...
b6? there would have followed 20
xa4
with the threat of
a8+. Therefore an escape square is necessary.

17 国d2 a4 18 国cd1 增b6 19 g3


Although White is temporarily stronger on the d-file, it is not easy for him to strengthen his position: thus, for example, if 19 h3, then 19... h5 is very good. However, the text move, which also prepares a possible f2-f4, gives Black the opportunity to carry out a simplifying manoeuvre.

If 20 $\Xi x d2$, then, of course, $20...\Xi d8$.

20... ②g4!

After this it appears that the advantage is with Black, but this only 'appears' to be so. It is true that both 21 ②f1 ③g7 with the threat of ... Id8, and 21 ②xg4 ③xg4 followed by ... Id8 are unsatisfactory for White, but he has

an adequate rejoinder in the form of the move...



21 **2**f5!

...which, at the least, leads to the exchange of Black's unpleasant bishop.

21...\(\partial\) xf5

There was no choice, since the variation 21...gxf5 22 exf5 營xf2+ 23 營xf2 公xf2 24 含xf2 全d5 25 f6! 星e8 26 全f5! would have been very favourable for White.

22 exf5 🖄 f6

Or first 22... **\$**g7.

23 ₩d6


23... 堂g7 24 罩d2 罩e8 25 fxg6 hxg6 26 營b4

In view of the threatened advance of the e-pawn White hardly has anything better than to offer this exchange, but it should have proved sufficient.

26...₩xb4

If Black wanted to play for a win, he could without risk have retreated his queen to a7. But after the queen exchange the most sensible thing for him would have been to accept the draw offered (with sufficient justification) by the opponent.

27 cxb4



27...a3

To his regret, the author has to say that this fruit of his ingenuity – outwardly so aesthetic - on no account deserved the exclamation with which it marks was accompanied by nearly all the critics. On the contrary, after the continuation bv correct opponent this move should have seriously compromised Black's game, whereas after 27... 2d5 28 a3 (or 28 b5) 28...f5 he would have easily gained a draw.

28 bxa3 \(\bar{2}\)a8 29 \(\bar{2}\)d3 e4 30 \(\bar{2}\)e3

This only plays into Black's hands, although it does not yet subject White to any danger.

But 30 \(\beta b3!\) would have set the opponent genuinely difficult problems, since if 30...\(\beta d8\) there would have followed 31 a4!, with the threat of quickly exploiting White's pawn majority on the


queenside by a4-a5, a2-a4 followed by b4-b5. Although then Black would have had various counterattacking possibilities, such as ... \(\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \alpha \end{aligned} \] and ... \(\begin{aligned} \beta \end{aligned} \), or ... \(\begin{aligned} \alpha \end{aligned} \) and that after a tough fight.

If after 30 \(\bar{2}\)b3 Black had replied 30...b5, then after 31 \(\bar{2}\)f1 his rook would no longer be able to invade White's position.

Now, however, Black achieves a perfectly satisfactory rook ending.

It was hardly possible to strengthen the position any more, since White was preparing the creation of a passed pawn on the h-file; if, for example, 34... a4, then 35 ac1 ad5 36 b5! cxb5 37 ac5.

35 **罩xb1 罩xa2**



36 罩e1?

A rook ending has only just arisen, and White already makes a decisive mistake. As it soon transpires, the idea of defending the b-pawn along the 4th rank is completely bad, and the attempt in connection with this to cut off the black king from the queenside cannot be realised.

36 罩b3! was correct, aiming to exploit the chances on the kingside as quickly as possible, for example: 36... 堂e5 37 罩e3+ 堂d5 38 罩f3 f5 39 h5! gxh5 40 罩xf5+ 堂c4 41 罩xh5 堂xb4 42 g4 etc. In this case a draw could hardly be avoided.

36... \(\bar{\pi} a4 37 \(\bar{\pi} e4 c5 \)

Now Black obtains a winning position, since it is obvious that even after 38 \(\beta f4+ \) the pawn cannot be taken.

38 罩f4+ 含e6 39 罩e4+ 含f6


Although Black was not in great time-trouble, he nevertheless decided to wait till the time control on move 40, in order only after this to calculate the not altogether simple order of moves of the king en route to d5. Now this is possible, but the next neutral king puts the win in serious jeopardy.

40 罩f4+ 含e7(?)

It was essential to go to e6, so that it would be immediately possible to occupy the d5-square, but then it would be impossible to return to f6, since that would have led to a three-fold repetition of position! After this error White again obtains drawing chances.

41 罩e4+ 常d7

If 41...\$\displaystyle{9}f8, then 42 \$\bar{2}\$e5 cxb4 43 \$\bar{2}\$b5 with a draw.



42 g4!

42...cxb4

After 42... 🖺 xb4 43 🗒 xb4 cxb4 44 \$\displayset e2\$ Black would even have encountered some problems. The correct continuation then would have been the following: 44... \$\displayset e6\$ 45 \$\displayset d3\$ \$\displayset f6!\$ 46 \$\display c4\$ \$\displayset d4\$ \$\displayset d5\$ \$\

43 h5 b5

Unnatural; after the simple 43...gxh5 44 gxh5 b5 White would have encountered serious problems, for example: 45 h6 b3

46 罩e3 b2 47 罩b3 堂c6! 48 罩xb2 In a etc. However, in the event of 46 罩xa4 (instead of 46 罩e3) 46...bxa4 47 h7 b2 48 h8營 b1營+49 堂g2 it would have been very difficult (if at all possible) for Black to win in the queen ending.

44 h6 b3 45 罩e3

Now the exchange of rooks would have been less favourable, of course, than in the variation given above. But now the 4th rank is blocked by the g-pawn, and White is able to win the opponent's passed pawn without giving up his own.

45...b2 46 \(\bar{2}\) b3 \(\dot{c}\) c6

47 \(\bar{z}\) xb2(?)

This continuation should have been sufficient, but much more accurate was 47 f3! 罩a3 (47...罩a2 48 曾g1!) 48 罩xb2 罩xf3+ 49 曾g2 冨e3 50 罩f2 etc.

47...\begin{aligned} 47...\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} 48 \begin{aligned} \

Black is forced to allow the enemy rook to occupy the 8th rank, since 48...\$b7 49 \$\mathbb{Z}\$c5 b4? would have had dismal consequences in view of 50 \$\mathbb{Z}\$h5!

It is clear that the king cannot go forward on account of h6-h7, and Black's last faint chance of a win is to switch the battle to the kingside.

52 曾d3 罩h3+ 53 曾c2 b3+

 h6-h7, with a draw.

54 **\$c1!**


More accurate than 54 \$\displaystyle{\psi}b2 \$\displaystyle{\psi}d6 55 \boxed{\boxed{\subsets}}b8 \displaystyle{\psi}e5! 56 \boxed{\boxed{\boxed{\subsets}}xb3 \boxed{\bo

54... \(\begin{aligned} \begi

Here also the win of the f2-pawn by 55... \$\begin{aligned}
\begin{aligned}
\be

56 **∲xb3**

Here White apparently imagined something, otherwise he would have chosen a simple way to draw: 56 h7 \$\ding*e7 57 \$\ding*xb3 \$\ding*f6 58 \$\ding*c3 \$\ding*g7 59 \$\ding*a8 \$\ding*xh7 60 \$\ding*d2 etc. But in this position White can permit allow himself a lot.



56...**∲e5!** 57 **∲c4**

After a weak move, again a very good one! Its idea is that against the threatened advance of the black king White can if necessary reply with an analogous manoeuvre with his king, for example: 57...\$\div e4 58\$\div c5! \$\div f3 59 \$\div d6 \$\div xf2 60 \$\div e7\$ f5 61 \$\div f6\$ with a draw. In addition, 58 \$\div d3\$ is threatened, with a perfectly safe position.

57... 国h3!

Black tries every chance, but they should all have been in vain.


58 **罩e8+**

Together with the following move – the simplest.

58... 常f5 59 常d4! 罩xh6 60 常e3 常g4 61 罩e4+

The safest way to ensure a draw was 61 堂e2! 罩h1 62 罩e4+ 堂f5 63 罩a4.

61...**∲h**3



62 罩f4?

This instructive mistake allows the decisive surrounding of the last white pawn. 62 \(\delta \)e2 would still have led to a draw.

62...f5 63 罩f3+

This loses immediately. But also in the event of 63 \(\mathbb{\subset} \) a4, and after 63 \(\mathbb{\subset} \) e2, Black would have won in the end by continuing 63...\(\mathbb{\subset} \) g2.


63... \$h2! 64 罩f4 罩h3+

White resigned. After 65... ∳g2 the pawn cannot be saved.

Game 6 F. Marshall – M. Vidmar New York 1927 (2) Four Knights Game C49

1 e4 e5 2 ②f3 ②c6 3 ②c3 ②f6 4 **\$b5 \$b4 5 0-0 0-0 6 d3 \$xc3 7 bxc3 d6 8 \$g5** 響e7

The well-known Metger defence, which after 9 all dd8 and 10...de6 usually leads to a difficult positional battle; in recent times it has been chosen with particular enthusiasm by Rubinstein. However, it is not so dangerous for White, such that (as in the present game) he should go in for the following unprincipled exchange, immediately simplifying the game.



9 **≜xc6(?)** bxc6 10 **罩b1**

If White made the exchange on c6 for the sake of immediately occupying the open file, he obviously overestimated the importance of this: for the moment the b7-point is defended, but in most cases even if the white rook

were able to penetrate there it would have no essential importance.

10...h6 11 \(\preceq\) xf6

If 11 \(\mathbb{L}\)h4, then 11...g5 would have been perfectly good.


11...₩xf6 12 ₩e2

It was more circumspect to play 12 c4 first, so that subsequently he would not have to go in for a dubious sacrifice.

12...₩e6!

Threatening not only 13... wxa2, but also 13...f5 exf5 wxf5 with a clear positional advantage. Therefore Marshall decides on a risky undertaking.

13 ②h4!?



13... **營f6?**

This queen move and the following repetition of moves exhibit a timidity altogether atypical of Vidmar.

What dangers could have threatened Black in the event of 13... 營xa2? After 14 c4 (otherwise the queen immediately returns) 14... 營a5 15 f4 (15 營e3 臭d7)

14 ②f3 ₩e6 15 ②h4

White, encouraged by the opponent's obvious peaceableness, leaves the pawn *en prise* a second time.

15... **当f6?** 16 **公f3 当e6** Draw agreed.

Third Round

Game 7 J. R. Capablanca – F. Marshall New York 1927 (3) Bogo-Indian Defence E11

1 d4 🖄 f6 2 🖄 f3 e6 3 c4 🕸 b4+ 4 🕸 d2 🕸 xd2+ 5 🖄 bxd2 d5?


After White has captured with the knight this is inappropriate, since the tension created in the centre opens for the white knight the prospect of occupying the c4-square. In keeping with the exchange of bishops was 5...d6 followed by ...e6-e5, occupying with pawns the dark squares, no longer needed by the black bishop which so quickly disappeared from the board.

6 g3 0-0 7 **≜**g2 **⊘**bd7 8 0-0 **₩**e7

The immediate 8...b6 equally

deserved attention. However, the move in the game is by no means as bad as the commentators think.

9 \cong c2



9...b6(!)

This may appear to be a simple but in fact it is oversight, accurately calculated. Since now other continuations (like the one chosen in the game) would not have allowed White to forcibly gain any appreciable advantage (for example: 10 De5 Dxe5 11 dxe5 2g4! 12 cxd5 exd5 13 2xd5 □b8, winning the e5-pawn, or – after the moves 10 cxd5 2xd5 made in the game - 11 a3 c5!, when Black may also gain a tempo by ...\$a6), Black's position still seems alright.

10 cxd5 2xd5 11 e4 2b4!

This is the idea of the freeing manoeuvre begun with 9...b6. However, 11...②5f6 12 豐xc7 皇a6 13 罩fc1 罩fc8 14 豐f4 豐b4 would have been inadequate on account of 15 ②b3 or 15 b3.

12 營c3(!)


In this way White at least forces the enemy knight to occupy the modest square a6. Of course, 12 **w**xc7? would have been a mistake on account of 12... **2**a6 followed by ... **5**fc8.

12...c5

But not 12... \(\hat{2}a6? 13 a3! \) \(\hat{x}fl \) 14 \(\hat{x}fl \).

13 a3 🖾 a6

13... ②c6 was bad on account of 14 d5!




14 dxc5

Simplification very typical of Capablanca's style of play, which, although it has the aim of eliminating any danger of losing, should also have given White very little. In my opinion, 14 \(\beta\)fe1! \(\beta\)b7 15 d5 or the immediate 14 d5 would have led to complicated play, favourable for White.

14...bxc5?

©f6 followed by ... Zad8 Black would have gained a draw without difficulty. Instead of this, without any chances of a counter-attack, he saddles himself with an irreparably weak pawn on the queenside. Woeful play!

15 ②c4 臭b7



16 5) fe5!

Again a typical Capablanca move, but this time completely irreproachable. The idea of retaining only the 'good' knight on c4 and the 'bad' one on a6 is very convincing.

16...**公xe5** 17 **營xe5 罩ad8** 18 **罩fd1**

Threatening an unpleasant knight invasion on d6.


18...f6 19 營c3 罩xd1+ 20 罩xd1 罩d8 21 罩d3

The immediate 21 \(\frac{1}{2}xd8+\) followed by 22 \(\frac{1}{2}b3 \) was also a very strong continuation, although not yet decisive.

21...**②b8**

Capablanca was obviously expecting this attempt to switch the

knight to a more active position and wanted to exploit the momentary hanging position of the black pieces on the b-file. However, against correct defence it should not have been so easy to do this.



24...©c6?

It is patently obvious that Black does not stand brilliantly, but the fact that he gives up the attacked pawn without any struggle can be explained only by some oversight in a combination or the hope of an illusory attack.

In reality, after 24... 全f7, although this move looks rather dangerous, no clear way for White to win is apparent, for example: 25 ②e3 豐c8! and now nothing is given by either 26 ②f5 豐c7 or 26 全xe6+ 豐xe6 27 豐xb8 豐xe4 28 豐xa7+ 全b7.

Thus after 24... \$\din 17\$ White would have had to find more subtle ways of carrying out decisive

manoeuvres (it is another question whether they can be found at all).

25 & xe6+ \$\ddot\delta h8 26 & d5

The secure position of the bishop in the centre suppresses all attempts by the opponent to gain an attack.

Desperation; White was also threatening 30 b4.

30 e5!

This is decisive.

30...fxe5 31 營xc5 h5 32 營f8+ 含h7 33 食g8+ 含h6 34 營d6+ g6 35 營f8+

Black resigned.

Game 8


A. Alekhine – A. Nimzowitsch

New York 1927 (3) English Opening A30

1 \$\tilde{2}\$ f6 2 c4 e6 3 \$\tilde{2}\$ c3 b6 4 g3

Apart from this system of development, which a few years ago was very popular – mainly in view of Reti's successes with it – the following variations are very good for White: 1) 4 d4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)b7 5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g5 followed by e2-e3, \(\frac{1}{2}\)d3 and so on; 2) 4 e4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)b7 5 d3 (5 e5? \(\frac{1}{2}\)e4), analogous to the strategy employed not without success by Nimzowitsch at the tournament in Dresden (1926).

4...**≜b7 5 ≜g2 c5 6 0–0 ≜e7**



7 b3(?)

After 7 d4 cxd4 8 2xd4 2xg2 9 2xg2 White would have stood well (cf. also the similar position in the Capablanca-Vidmar game from the 4th round), whereas now Black is able to seize the initiative.

7...d5 8 De5

White wants to complicate the play at all costs, instead of admitting the inadvisability of his last move and playing simply 8 cxd5 2xd5 9 2b2 2f6 with a defensive position sufficient for a draw.


8...Øbd7 9 f4

The consistent continuation – any exchange in the centre would only aid the opponent's development.

9...**≜d6 10 cxd5 exd5**

Black displays a lack of courage and determination. As I said to my opponent immediately after the game, here he could have obtained a highly promising game if he had decided on a pawn sacrifice (probably temporary!), for example: 10...②xe5 11 fxe5 ②xe5 12 dxe6 ③xg2 13 exf7+ ③xf7 14 ③xg2 〖e8! with

strong pressure on the central files, and with the white king's position weakened. After the routine move in the game the advantage is even rather on the side of White.



11 ②c4!

This simple reply was apparently overlooked by Black.


11...**₩b8!**

The only move, since if the bishop moved there would have followed 12 2e3! with an obvious advantage for White.

12 公xd6+ 營xd6 13 d3

Unhappy with his handling of the opening, White aims only for a draw and relieves the situation in the centre.

13...0-0 14 e4 dxe4 15 dxe4



15... **營d4+**

The only move, but sufficient.
16 營xd4 cxd4 17 公d5 公xd5 18 exd5 公f6 19 鱼b2 皇xd5 20 皇xd4 皇xg2 21 堂xg2

Draw agreed. Black, of course, plays 21... 45d5 and maintains the knight in this strong position.

Game 9 M. Vidmar – R. Spielmann New York 1927 (3) Queen's Indian Defence E14

1 d4 🖾 f6 2 🖾 f3 c5 3 e3

Too tame. If White could not bring himself to play 3 d5, which did indeed have some drawbacks, then 3 c4 was perfectly good; if now 3...cxd4 4 2xd4 e6 5 2c3 \$\delta\$b4 (as in the game Przepiorka-Spielmann, Munich 1926), then 6 \$\delta\$b3 2a6 7 g3! with advantage to White.

3...b6

This reply is unnatural and, since White will most probably be able to block the diagonal of the

fianchettoed bishop by d4-d5, it is illogical.

It was quite possible to play simply 3...d5 (4 \(\)\d2d3 \(\)\d2c6 or even 4...\(\)\d2g4) or first make the waiting move 3...e6.


4 c4

Of course.

4...cxd4 5 exd4 e6 6 \(\hat{2}\)d3 \(\hat{2}\)b7 7 0-0 \(\hat{2}\)e7 8 \(\hat{2}\)c3 0-0(?)

After this inaccurate move Black could have ended up in an uncomfortable defensive position.

First 8...d6 was correct, in order to be able to answer 9 d5 with 9...e5.



9 d5! d6

Of course, 9...exd5 10 cxd5 ②xd5 11 ②xd5 এxd5 12 এxh7+ followed by 營xd5 was unfavourable.

10 dxe6(?)

Play against the illusory weakness of the d6- and e6-points suggests itself and on a superficial glance at the position it seems quite appropriate. However, the now resurrected bishop on b7 and the

open f-file give Black more than adequate counterplay.

The logical development of the preceding moves was 10 2d4! e5 (10... 8 11 2e1) 11 2f5 followed by f2-f4, when it would be hard for Black to find a way to counter White's positional advantage.

10...fxe6 11 **②**d4


Somewhat better chances were offered by 11 ②g5 豐c8 12 罩e1 e5 13 豐c2, for example: 13...h6 (13...豐g4 is better) 14 皇f5 豐c6 15 ②d5 etc. The knight invasion on f5, intended with the move in the game, proves pointless.

11... **#c8 12 #e2**

Also after 12 罩e1 Black would have gained counterplay: 12...e5 13 单f5 ②bd7 14 单e6+ 曾h8 15 ②f5 豐e8 16 ②xd6 单xd6 17 豐xd6 ②c5 with advantage to Black.

12...e5 13 **皇f5 ②bd7** 14 **皇e6+ 曾h8** 15 **②f5 豐e8** 16 **②g3**

Disillusioned by the failure of his faulty expedition (16 \$\sigma b5?\$ \$\sigma c5!\$ etc.), Vidmar retreats, instead of securing the advantage of the two bishops by 16 \$\sigma xe7 \mathbb{\text{\text{W}}} xe7 17\$ \$\frac{1}{2}\$h3, although, it is true, in the given position this would have been quite harmless for Black. Now Black begins counterplay on the c-file.



19 \(\preceq\)xc5(?)


This voluntary exchange of a bishop that was so necessary for the defence of the dark squares is completely inexplicable for a player of Vidmar's class. He could have continued, say, 19 \(\subseteq fd1\) (19...\(\subseteq e6\) 20 \(\subseteq d5\)) with a game not without chances.

19...**豐xc5 20 罩ac1**

Here also 20 \(\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \text{Efd1} & \text{was more consistent.} \end{aligned} \)

20... **a**6(!) 21 **a**ce4 **a**xe4 22 **a**xe4 **a**ce4 **a**se4 22

White obviously overlooked that his c-pawn could be captured, otherwise he would have parried the threatened 23...d5 by, for example, 23 \(\vert\)d3! (23...d5 24 \(\vert\)xd5 \(\vert\)xd5 25 cxd5 \(\vert\)xf1 26 \(\vert\)xf1 with advantage), after which his position could well have been defended. But after the move in the game Black gains good winning chances.



23...\(\preceq\) xc4!

unpleasant surprise White. After 24 b3? d5 25 2 d2 ②c5 or 25 ②g5 \wightarrow\ge g6 not only would he not have won a piece, but himself would have he material. With the continuation chosen by White he succeeds in temporarily avoiding threatened loss of a pawn, but at the cost of Black's pressure increasing on both wings.

Weak, and from this moment Black begins playing more and more weakly, until the game is finally drawn.


27 \hspace h5 \hspace f6

Placing the queen on the f-file, leaving the c4-pawn undefended, is at the least an unsuccessful preparation for the move ... \(\delta xf2\).

Strong was 27... \$\tilde{\text{\psi}}e4!\$ (with the threat of 28... \$\tilde{\text{\psi}}xf2!\$) 28 \$\tilde{\text{\psi}}h1\$ \$\tilde{\text{\psi}}xf2\$ when White cannot, as in the game, make the important defensive move g2-g3.

28 \$\disph1! \&\text{\$\pm\$xf2 29 g3

The trap 29 冨xc4 皇g3! is too transparent (30 冨g1* 冨e1 31 hxg3 冨xg1+ followed by 響f1+ and 響xc4).



29...₩c6+

Although with his last few moves Black has largely squandered his winning chances, he should nevertheless have made a last attempt by playing 29... \$\begin{align*}\equiv 6+ 31 &g2 \begin{align*}\equiv 65 \end{align*} etc.

30 **皇g2 營c5 31 營xc5 皇xc5 32** 冨xc4 冨xf1+ 33 **皇**xf1 冨f8

Draw agreed.

Fourth Round

Game 10 J. R. Capablanca – M. Vidmar

New York 1927 (4)

Queen's Indian Defence A30

1 d4 4 f6 2 f3 e6 3 c4 b6 4 g3 \$\displaystyle b7 5 \displaystyle g2 c5

I have always considered this move to be unfavourable in the given position in view of the possibility of 6 d5, and I give preference to 5...\$\documentum{1}{2}b4+ and 5...\$\documentum{2}{2}e7.


6 0-0

This reply is quite possible, but it is too harmless in character, allowing Black to equalise, and in various ways.

6...cxd4 7 🖄 xd4 🕸 xg2 8 🕸 xg2 🕸 e7

But this is inconsistent, since Black should aim as soon as possible to rid himself of the weakness on the d-file. Although with this aim the immediate 8...d5 is not good on account of 9 \(\mathbb{\text{W}}a4+!\) (the 3rd game of the Capablanca-Alekhine match), 8...\(\mathbb{\text{W}}c8!\) was the correct preparatory move, for example: 9 b3 (9 \(\mathbb{\text{W}}d3 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{C}}}c6!\)) 9...\(\mathbb{\text{L}}e7 10 \(\mathbb{\text{L}}b2 \)\(\mathbb{\text{W}}b7+ 11 \) f3 d5 12 cxd5 \(\text{\text{L}}xd5 \) 13 \(\mathbb{\text{W}}d2 \) 0-0 14 e4 \(\text{\text{\text{L}}}f6.\)

9 **②c3**



9...0-0(?)

Now also 9... wc8 very much deserved attention (10 b3 d5!).

10 e4! 營c8

With a delay of one tempo!


11 b3 營b7 12 f3 公c6 13 **身b2 富fd8** 14 **富e1** 公xd4

Vidmar plays the entire first part of the game inaccurately. Why, for example, does he now develop the white queen? The immediate 14...d6 was simpler.

Again, an obvious loss of a tempo!

16 \dd \delta e7 17 \delta ad1 d6

Despite the numerous inaccuracies committed by Black, his position is quite solid, since in this variation, as is well known, *in the middlegame* the d6-point can be defended without difficulty.



Subsequently Capablanca tries to exploit his only serious chance, which consists in a flank attack. And indeed, the opponent, who is extremely cramped in his movements, is now required to defend with exceptional accuracy.

18 **罩e2 罩d7** 19 **罩ed2 罩ad8** 20 **②e2**

The simplest way of conclusively preventing the move ...d6-d5 (in view of 20...d5 21 \(\hat{\omega}\)xf6 etc.).

20...\₩a8

In order to retreat the knight, after which at the given moment there could have followed 21 e5!.

21 \wedge e3 h6 22 h4 \wedge b7 23 a4


In order to suppress once and for all the freeing move ... b6-b5.

23...②e8 24 ②f4 臭f6 25 臭xf6 ②xf6 26 g4 ②h7

After this White's attack has very little chance of success, since the knight on f4 is tied down by the need to cover the d5-square. As soon as this knight ceases to control this square (say, after 5)h5

is played) there can immediately follow ...e6-e5, after which the black knight would acquire interesting attacking possibilities.

Therefore, Capablanca soon transposes into a rook endgame.



27 ∰c3 ♠f8 28 g5 hxg5 29 hxg5 ♠g6!

Perfectly correct. If now 30 \$\omega\$h5, then 30...e5 31 \$\omega\$g3 \$\omega\$c7 followed by ...\$\omega\$f8, ...\$\omega\$d8 and so on. Therefore, White has nothing better than to exchange.

30 公xg6 fxg6 31 營d4 營c6


The c5-square is now an adequate counter-argument for Black.

32 **含g3 營c5 33 f4 含f7 34 含g4 a5** 35 罩h2 **營xd4**?

Since it is unfavourable for White to exchange queens (on the last few moves in view of ...bxc5 with pressure on the b3-pawn, and now on account of ...dxc5 followed by an invasion on the d-file), and retreating the queen (to c3 or b2) is also not good for him in view of ...d6-d5!, the simplest

way to draw here was by waiting tactics. Therefore ... \$\displies f7-g8-f7-g8 etc. was correct, inviting White himself to decide on how to change the position. Vidmar voluntarily goes, at the least, into a very dubious endgame.

36 罩xd4




36... \(\bar{Z}\)e7 37 \(\bar{Z}\)hd2 \(\bar{Z}\)ed7 38 f5

This breakthrough suggests itself, but in my opinion it should have been made only on the next move: 38 \(\begin{aligned} \delta \d 39 f5 gxf5+ (if 39...\$f7, then 40 fxe6+ followed by 41 \(\begin{array}{c} \addata d5 \) and then \(\bar{2}\)b5, or in some cases c4-c5 with advantage to White) 40 exf5 exf5+ 41 \$\displaysf5 \$\displaysf7 42 g6+ with a winning position. Also, in other variations it would have been easier, than after the move in the game, to transform the positional advantage into a material one.

38...gxf5+ 39 exf5 exf5+ 40 \$\div xf5\$ g6+ 41 \$\div g4 \$\div f8\$

The only, and at the same time temporary defence against the threat of $\Xi f2+$ and $\Xi f6$ with a

winning position. If 41... 堂e8, then 42 罩h2! etc. (see below).



42 罩f2+?

This leads only to a draw. The correct way to convert the advantage, achieved with such difficulty, was again the gain of a tempo — 42 \(\beta 4d3! \). If now 42...\(\beta e8 \), then 43 \(\beta h2! \), and after the exchange of one pair of rooks the remaining white rook invades at f6 or b8: 43...\(\beta f8 \) (or 43...\(\beta f8 \) (threatening 46 \(\beta h6 \)) 45...\(\beta f8 \) 46 \(\beta xf8 \) \(\beta xf8 \) 47 \(\beta h8 + \), then \(\beta b8 \) etc.

Capablanca forces the exchange of rooks with a changed and less favourable pawn formation, after which Vidmar saves the game without difficulty.

If 43 \(\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \text{ifd2}, \text{ then } 43... \(\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \text{e} \eta \\ \text{with} \\ \text{a draw}. \end{aligned} \)

43... \(\bar{2}\) xf6 44 gxf6 \(\dot{2}\) f7 45 \(\dot{2}\) g5 \(\bar{2}\) e8! 46 \(\bar{2}\) xd6 \(\bar{2}\) e5+ 47 \(\dot{2}\) f4 \(\bar{2}\) e6

Much simpler than 47...\(\bar{2}f5+\) and \(...\bar{2}xf6.\)

48 罩d5 **含xf6**

Here the game could have been calmly concluded.

Draw agreed.

Game 11 F. Marshall – A. Alekhine New York 1927 (4) Oueen's Pawn Opening A47

1 d4 \$\frac{6}{2}\$ f6 2 \$\frac{6}{2}\$ f3 b6

In recent times first ...e7-e6 and only then ...b7-b6 has been played. After the move in the game, they usually reply 3 c4, after which it reduces to a transposition of moves. Marshall's next move gives the play a different character.


3 **g**5 **b**7

If on the 2nd move Black had played 2...e6, then now 3...c5 followed by ... b6 would, as is known, have been quite acceptable. By contrast, in the given situation 3...c5 would have been obviously unfavourable in view of 4 d5.

Apart from the move in the game Black's only other possibility was 3... De4, after which the play could have continued roughly as follows: 4 \$\frac{1}{2}\$h4 \$\frac{1}{2}\$b7 5 \$\frac{1}{2}\$bd2 \$\frac{1}{2}\$xd2 6 \$\frac{1}{2}\$xd2 (6 \$\frac{1}{2}\$xd2 c5! ...g7-g6, ...\$\frac{1}{2}\$g7 and so on), and it would not be easy for Black to rid himself of the pressure on e7, which would become an Achilles' heel of his position.

4 6)bd2 e6

A dangerous experiment: for the sake of retaining the two bishops Black allows his opponent to set up a strong position in the centre in the good old style. 4...c5! was more circumspect, and more in keeping with his 2nd move.



In order to develop the king's bishop, which at the moment was uncomfortable on account of 9 e5. Black is already behind in development, and he is forced to resort to such unnatural manoeuvres in order to maintain the balance. He needlessly allowed White to play e2-e4 unhindered.

9 0-0 **≜e7 10 \(\) ad1**

Up to here White has played correctly. But now, in view of his better development, he should have taken more energetic measures in the centre; for example, by playing 10 c3 2d7 11 2e1! followed by f2-f4, 3f3, Zae1 etc. he could have set up a powerful attacking position, without allowing the

opponent any counter-chances. The move in the game is also not bad; it only has the slight drawback of allowing a counter in the centre.

10....\(\tilde{

Before castling Black must at any cost divert the opponent from his planned attack. After 11...0–0 White would have gained an extremely threatening position by continuing 12 ©e1! followed by f2-f4 and ©e1-c2-e3.

12 dxc5

White changes his plan and wants to exploit the open d-file. However, his very next move shows that the details of this plan – in principle perfectly natural – were not accurately prepared.


12...bxc5 13 \(\preceq\$b5(?)

After this Black obtains a perfectly solid position and gradually gains an advantage. White should concerned himself with have depriving Black of his counter-chance - the advantage of the two bishops, and with this aim played 13 \(\mathbelle{\pmathb 14 ₩xa6 ②b6 it is true that Black would not have suffered any immediate loss of material, but the weakness of the light squares on the queenside together with the need to defend the d6-point would undoubtedly have subsequently caused him serious problems.

13...a6

Not immediately 13...0–0 in view of 14 ②c4 Wc7 15 &xd7! Wxd7 16 ②xd6 &xd6 17 e5 with advantage to White.

14 \(\partia\)a4 0-0



15 **奠c2**

White has nothing better than to admit the faultiness of his manoeuvre and to retreat: if 15 \$\overline{\infty}\$c4 Black had the perfectly adequate defence 15...\$\overline{\infty}\$b6.

15... **營c7** 16 **公c4 罩fd8** 17 **罩d2 分f8** 18 **罩fd1**

All these manoeuvres, aimed at exploiting the illusory weakness of the d6-point, lead merely to the development of the black pieces.

18...a5


The immediate 18... ab8 was arguably more accurate, in order only if necessary to concede the b5-point to White. But the move played is also perfectly good.

The knight has only just jumped proudly to b5, but it already transpires that it cannot be established there without positional concessions. Thus if White had parried the threat of 22... 14 by 22

g3, Black would have had a choice between two good continuations: 22...c4 23 &xc4 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xe4, or in some cases ...d6-d5, in order subsequently to exploit the weakness of the h1-a8 diagonal.

22...c4 23 **公bd4 豐c5 24 息b1**

Black has succeeded in not only overcoming his opening problems, but also in gaining counterplay prospects good with in endgame thanks to the possibility of fixing the b2-pawn. The most natural way now of exploiting this possibility was 24... \(\mathref{\pm} \) a8 followed by ... \begin{aligned} \begin{ very promising was 24...\$f8, preparing to play the knight to e5. Instead of this Black makes a slightly hasty move, allowing the opponent to force desirable simplification.




24... ②e5(?) 25 ②xe5 dxe5

After 25... wxe5 White could have gained a rather dangerous attack, by playing 26 f4 and (after doubling rooks on the f-file) e4-e5. 26 \$\angle\$f!

The only move. If, for example, 26 ©c2, then 26... Zxd2 27 Zxd2 &c6! with a clear advantage for Black.

After 28 ₩xd2 &c6! and ... &a4 Black would still have retained an advantage. But now the rather passive position of the bishop on b1 and the weakness of the b2pawn are compensated by the fact that White controls the only open file. Strictly speaking, already now the game should have been agreed drawn. But it appears to Marshall that his position is better, although over the course of the next dozen moves he merely disarranges his pawns, as a result of which the dark squares on his kingside become weakened.

28... **& c6 29 h3 營b7 30 營e2 營b5** 31 營d1 **� h7 32 營f3 & e8 33 營e3 & c6**



34 a3

This was hardly essential at the given moment. This move,

condemning the b2-pawn to immobility, should have been made only after ... a5-a4.

34... 当b7 35 当e2 兔b5 36 当e3 兔c6 37 f3 当e7 38 兔a2 兔b5 39 含h2 兔a6 40 当e2(?) 当c5

After White, for no obvious reason, conceded the important g1-a7 diagonal, Black's position is preferable.

41 \(\bar{2}\)d7 \(\bar{2}\)b5 42 \(\bar{2}\)d2

Of course, not 42 罩xf7? 鼻e8.

42... **基b7 43 身b1**


Now White pins his hopes on the 'threat' of f3-f4 followed by a discovered check. Black could at any moment have extinguished these hopes by playing ...g7-g6 and ...\$\dot\gq\$7, but he does not do this, since he himself hopes to obtain winning chances after f3-f4.

43... \(\delta a 4 4 \delta a 2 \delta b 5 45 \delta b 1 \delta a 4 4 6 \delta h 1

In order that after f3-f4xe5 Black would take the pawn without check.

46...罩b6

If Black did not want to make the move ...g7-g6, it was better to play 46... ab8. If in this case White were to play f3-f4, he would inevitably (slowly but surely) have ended up in an inferior position.



47 f4

This strategically incorrect move proves acceptable here thanks to possible tactical tricks. Although Black now gains the opportunity to achieve a draw almost by force, without this move White cannot play for a win, and therefore the break undertaken by him should not be criticised.

47....**≜b**3

It is clear that 47...exf4 would have been unfavourable on account of 48 e5+ g6 49 \(\begin{aligned} \text{ ad4} \text{ etc. On the} \end{aligned} \) other hand, it was necessary to defend the c4-pawn somehow in view of the threat of 48 fxe5 \widetilde{\psi}xe5 49 \widetilde{\psi}\text{xc4. Apart from the move in the game, for this aim only 47....**拿b**5 and 47...\Zc6 were possible. In reply to the former White could have continued as in the game, while in the event of the latter the continuation 48 fxe5 豐xe5 49 罩d5! 豐f4 50 e5+ g6 51 Zxa5 would have been even more unpleasant for Black.

48 fxe5 \widetilde{\psi} xe5 49 \widetilde{\psi} e3!

Now the drawbacks to Black's 46th move are evident: White makes this important attacking move with gain of tempo. On the contrary, the immediate 49 \(\beta d5 \) would have been incorrect in view of 49...\(\beta f4! \) 50 e5+ g6 51 \(\beta d2 \) \(\beta b5 \), which is advantageous to Black.

49...罩c6

By playing 49... § 50 e5+ g6 51 § f3! § xd2 52 § xf7+ \$ h8 53 § f8+ \$ h7 54 § xg6+ \$ xg6 55 § f6+ \$ h7 etc. Black could have immediately forced a draw. With the move in the game he provokes further complications, hoping that he will be able to parry the seemingly so dangerous attack and then exploit the rather advanced white e-pawn. However, as the game continuation shows, this plan is too bold and should have had unfavourable consequences for Black.

50 罩d5!

White's entire attack, begun on the 47th move, is based on this move. The bishop, so long inactive, finally comes into play and its activity on the b1-h7 diagonal causes Black a great deal of trouble.

50...₩c7 51 e5+ \$\dig g8

After 51...g6 52 \(\bar{2}\)d4 it would not have been possible to parry the threat of \(\bar{2}\)h4.*

52 罩d4 常f8

The king must as soon as possible move off the diagonal on which the bishop is operating.


52... I c 5 would of course have been premature in view of 53 營e4. 53 營f4

With the terrible threat of 54 \(\hat{2}\)g6 followed by \(\beta d8+\).

53... 會e7 54 **皇**h7!

A very strong move, the main idea of which is that without loss of time the bishop moves off the back rank, which for the subsequent battle *should* have had enormous significance.

First of all 55 \(\frac{1}{2}g\)8 is a very serious threat, and as a result the retreat of the queen is forced.



54... **營b8 55 營g3! 罩c5**

Black must try to counterattack, since in the event of passive defence by 55...\$\div f8\$ the move 56 \$\overline{\text{Z}}\delta ! would again have been very unpleasant, for example: 56...\$\div g6\$ 57 \$\overline{\text{Z}}\delta g6\$ fxg6 58 \$\overline{\text{Z}}\delta g6\$ or 56...\$\delta 57 \$\overline{\text{Z}}\delta g6\$ 58 \$\overline{\text{Z}}\delta g4!\$ with a decisive advantage.

56 罩e4(?)

Marshall has very subtly exploited Black's risky 49th move and gained an advantage.

But instead of now choosing a natural continuation, ensuring him a favourable endgame, he, as is his habit, cannot resist the temptation to play for further complications in the hope that – by hook or by crook – he will be able to checkmate his opponent...

56 營xg7! was correct, with the possible continuation 56...營xe5 (56...臺xe5 57 營g3!) 57 營xh6 區d5 58 區xd5 營xd5 with quite good chances of a draw for Black.

56...**∲f8!**

Black avoids an interesting trap: 56...營h8 57 營f2 (after 56...全c2? the same move wins immediately, of course) 57... 這d5 58 罩f4 營e8 59 全e4! 冨xe5 60 營a7+ 全f8 61 全c6! and wins.


57 **Åg6**

As ineffective as anything else: White threw away his real chances with his previous light-weight move.

57...f5!

By playing 57...f6 Black could have forced a draw: 58 學f2! 基xe5 59 基xe5 學xe5 60 學a7 學e1+ with perpetual check.

The move in the game is a last attempt to play for a win.



58 罩d4!

58...₩xe5

Of course, not 58... axe5 59 ad7 with a winning position.

If 61 營xe5 冨xe5 62 冨d7, then 62...冨e2 63 冨f7+ 含e8! 64 冨xf5+ 含e7 65 冨f7+ 含d6 and wins.

61...₩f6

Had it not been for the fact that for his next 18 moves Black had only two and a half minutes left, he would have tried playing 61... 2d5, although even then after 62 2xd5 2xd5 63 2f4! with the threats of 2rd and 2b8+ he would hardly have been able to exploit his material advantage.

62 \wg3 \wg65

Draw agreed.

Game 12

A. Nimzowitsch – R. Spielmann


New York 1927 (4) Nimzowitsch Opening A03

1 ②f3 d5 2 b3 c5 3 **\$b2** ②c6 4 e3 ⑤f6

Why does Black so submissively give up the battle for the e5-point? At any event, 4...\$g4 or 4...a6 was more energetic, in order to retain the option of choosing between different development plans.

5 \(\partial b 5 \) \(\partial d 7 \) 6 0–0 e6 7 d3 \(\partial e 7 \)

8 🖾 bd2 0-0



9 **<u>\$</u>xc6**

This exchange is an integral part of the development plan chosen by White, and there was no sense in delaying it. He could perhaps still have played 9 \(\mathbb{\math

quences of 9... 42d4 would favour the opponent) White cannot get by without occupying the e5-square.

9...\$xc6 10 De5 Ec8

In a game from the next round Vidmar chose here (with reversed colours) the set-up with ... #c7 and ... ad8, but soon he also obtained a not altogether satisfactory game.

Already now White's position is undoubtedly better.

11 f4 🖾 d7 12 👑 g4


A natural move (if 12...f5 there follows 13 \widetilde{\pi}xg7+!), but it has one drawback: fundamental starting from this moment, all White's hopes are based on a direct attack (and, of course, on achieving by this a material advantage), and as a consequence of this the other advantages of his position (the splendid diagonal of the b2-bishop and the flexibility of his pawn structure) are nullified to a greater or lesser extent. In view of this I would have preferred here the restrained continuation 12 ②xc6 \(\begin{aligned} \Begin{alig this is a matter of taste and playing style. In the game Nimzowitsch also obtains good, sound play with definite winning chances.

12...**②**xe5 13 **≜**xe5

13 fxe5 was weaker in view of 13... ≜g5!.

Otherwise, White could have intensified the pressure by continuing 15 \(\begin{array}{c} \alpha fl \) etc.

15 fxe5 \(\text{\tint{\text{\tin}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\\text{\text{\te}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi{\texi{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\texit{\text{\ti



16...h6

An over-passive move, giving the opponent an opportunity to conclusively consolidate his positional superiority.

16... 2e8! deserved attention (not 16...f5 in view of 17 exf6 followed by \$\mathbb{\text{\mathbb{\mathbb{G}}}\depta +\), when the seemingly powerful rook sacrifice (indeed decisive, in the event of its acceptance) 17 \$\mathbb{\mathbb{G}}\delta!? would not have given anything after the simple 17... \$\mathbb{\mathbb{G}} a5 18 \$\mathbb{\mathbb{G}} f3 \text{ h6!}\$ (19 \$\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}\xkh6? gxh6 20 \$\mathbb{\mathbb{G}}\xkh6 f6 21 exf6 \$\mathbb{\mathbb{G}}\delta^*).

Therefore, White would have had to be satisfied with the modest continuation 17 \(\bar{2}\)h3, but in this case after 17...h6 18 \(\bar{2}\)f3 f5 19 \(\bar{2}\)h4 \(\bar{2}\)d8 Black would have obtained a perfectly defensible position.

17 **\ \ \ \ af1** g6?

Now 17... 2e8 would not have been as good as on the previous move, because White could have exchanged his e5-pawn for the h6-pawn by playing 18 2g3 f5 19


₩xh6 ₩xe5 20 ₩f4! followed by �f3. However, the pawn sacrifice associated with the move in the game leads to an endgame that, although protracted, is completely lost. It is obvious that here Spielmann missed something.

18 豐xh6 豐xe5 19 罩f6! 豐h5

The only defence against \(\begin{aligned} & \perp & 1 \\ & 1 \end{aligned} & 1 \\ & 1 \end{aligned} & 1 \\ & 1 \end{aligned} & 1 \\ &

20 \(\delta\) xh5 gxh5 21 \(\delta\) f3

21 \(\bar{2}\)h6 followed by \(\bar{2}\)xh5 was also good enough.



21...罩c7!

Again, the only defence against the threat of 22 ②g5, after which there would now have followed 22... Ze7. Therefore, White must be satisfied with the simple win of the pawn.


22 国h6 f6 23 约h4 兔e8

It is obvious that the f-pawn could not be defended.

But not 26 ②g6 on account of 26... \$\ding{\pm}g7!\$, when after the exchange of rooks the knight

cannot be saved.** But now also its position on the rook's file is not very favourable. Subsequently White is forced to spend much effort on the conversion of his material advantage, for the reason that he is unable to occupy a post in the centre with his knight.

26... **會g7 27 罩f4 拿d7**



28 \(\disperse e2(?)

After 28 del! Black's reply, eliminating the 'e5-problem', would not have been possible.

28...e5! 29 罩f5

Now this is ineffective, since the h5-pawn is indirectly defended (... \(\hat{g} g4+\)).


29... **Ze8 30 Zf2 e4 31 Zf4**

Not immediately 31 \delta d2 in view of 31...d4!.

The knight has to be transferred to a more active sector of the board: after the advance of the black e-pawn the f4-square has become accessible, and as a result of the following exchange the e3-square also becomes free.

33... \(\hat{\\}_{1}\) 34 d4! cxd4 35 exd4 \(\bar{\\}_{2}\) 36 c3 a5 37 \(\bar{\\}_{1}\) f2 a4 38 \(\hat{\\}_{2}\) e3 a3 39 \(\bar{\\}_{2}\) c2!

Now the strong threat of 40 c4 forces the bishop to lift its control of the g2-square.



43...**∲e**7?

After 43...\(\mathbb{e}\)c2 (44 \(\beta\)d2 \(\mathbb{e}\)b1) White would also have found a way to win, for example \(\beta\)g1, h2-h4, g3-g4 and so on, but Black could still have obliged his opponent to find it. Now, however, after the loss of a second pawn, Black's position is hopeless.

44 🖾 xd3 exd3 45 b4!

Another subtlety: after 45 \$\dispxd3\$ \$\frac{1}{2}\$ \$\dispxd3\$ \$\frac{1}{2}\$ \$\dispxd4\$ \$\dispxd4\$

45... 當d6 46 當xd3 罩f2 47 罩d2 罩f3+ 48 當c2 當e6 49 罩e2+ 當d6 50 當b3 罩d3 51 罩e5 h4 52 gxh4 罩h3 53 罩h5 當c6 54 罩h6+ 當b7 55 h5

Black resigned.

Fifth Round

Game 13 A. Alekhine – J. R. Capablanca New York 1927 (5) Queen's Indian Defence E15

1 d4 🖄 f6 2 c4 e6 3 🖄 f3 b6 4 g3 \$\dose{b}\$ b7 5 \$\delta\$ g2 c5 6 d5

I made this move without particular thought, being concerned only about, at the least, avoiding a draw. The move, however, is perfectly good, but subsequently it demands very accurate, consistent play. Castling or 6 dxc5 would have promised too little.

6...exd5 7 **2**h4

Suggested by Rubinstein in the Collijns' Textbook. But the new manoeuvre, suggested by Berger – 7 ②g5 and then possibly ②h3-f4 (f2), is interesting and gives good chances.

7...g6 8 🖾 c3 👲 g7 9 0-0

This natural move was condemned by some critics, who suggested instead 9 4)b5. However, I cannot share this opinion, since after the simple 9...0–0 10 ∅d6 &c6 White would not have possibility any exploiting the invasion of his knight. No, the real inaccuracies and mistakes came later.

9...0-0